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Introduction
In 2004, the Commonwealth Parliament of Australia amended its Marriage Act to codify the long-standing common law definition of “marriage”
as “the union of a man and a woman to the exclusion of all others voluntarily entered into for life.” A decade earlier, the Congress of the United
States had enacted the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), whose Section 3
provided that “in determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of
any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative
bureaus and agencies of the United States, the word ‘marriage’ means only
a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife.”
There is nothing especially remarkable about two countries with a shared
English common law tradition enacting similar laws close in time; however,
the two countries’ distinct approaches to federalism in the area of family
law make the coincidental passage of national laws on same-sex marriage
striking and the federalism issues raised by the two statutes entirely distinct. Where the issue in the United States turned on the extent to which
Congress could regulate in an area traditionally left to the states, the issue
in Australia turned on the extent to which the Commonwealth Parliament’s
constitutionally enumerated power to regulate marriage and divorce
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restrained its own power, as well as that of the states, to recognize same-sex
marriage.
In this Article, we trace the very distinct federalism issues that today
surround the two countries’ treatment of same-sex marriage back to the
constitutional divergence put into place by the Australians in reaction to
the United States’ experience with divorce in the Nineteenth Century. We
then follow the respective developments of the two countries’ divorce law
through to the present, and we consider the special problems encountered,
and solutions developed, under the two countries’ distinct family law federalism regimes. We end with a consideration of same-sex marriage,
reflecting on how these different approaches to family law federalism have
shaped, and continue to shape, the development of the law on this central
social issue.
I. Australia’s Qualified Adoption of American Federalism
In 1890, a group of political leaders in the Australian colonies met in
Melbourne to explore their possible mutual interest in creating an Australian constitution. In that conference and in the consequent constitutional
conventions held in 1891 in Sydney and in 1897– 98 in Adelaide, Sydney,
and Melbourne,1 it was clear that any constitutional system would have to
be a federal system in which the colonies (Australia’s future states) maintained considerable political autonomy within the framework of a national
government.2 A number of countries offered models for Australia to emulate, including Canada, which had a federal system with a written constitution within the unwritten British Constitution (as Australia would have).
But Australia chose the United States as its primary model because the
American Constitution seemed to shift less power to the national government and retain more for the states than Canada’s Constitution did.3 One
of the Australian constitutional framers, Andrew Inglis Clark, was such an
advocate for the American constitutional model that he brought to the
1891 Australasian Federal Convention a complete draft of a federal constitution that was expressly based in large part on the Constitution of the
1. The Australian Constitution was developed and officially approved in several
stages, starting with two separate “Australasian Federal Conventions.” See JOHN M. WILLIAMS, AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 134 (2005). The first convention, held in Sydney in 1891, produced a complete constitution that was never officially
approved; the later convention, held in three separate locations between 1897 and
1898— Adelaide (1897), Sydney (1897), and Melbourne (1898)— built on the 1891 document. See id. at 31– 33, 134, 411– 12, 475– 80, 496– 98, 762– 64, 794– 803. After one
unsuccessful referendum in 1898, followed by modifications by the colonial premiers, a
second referendum was approved in 1899 by the Australian people; and, after further
modifications by the British Parliament, that document (the “Australian Constitution
Act”) became effective on January 1, 1901 as a British Statute (as, in form, it remains)
although Australia has been entirely independent since 1986. See id. at 1145, 1151,
1160– 68.
2. See id. at 3.
3. See id. at 65, 66– 67 (Clark’s explanatory memo).
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United States.4 Complimenting the American Constitution more than the
framers of the Australian Constitution, Sir Owen Dixon lamented that the
Australian framers’ fascination with the “incomparable” American constitutional model “damped the smouldering fires of their originality.”5
In connection with marriage and divorce, however, neither Dixon’s
criticism of the Australian framers nor a general preference for decentralization held true. Sparked by what was perceived as the scandalous “blot”
on the American Constitution, a “blot” which allowed American divorce
law to vary substantially from state to state, the Australian framers rejected
the American approach of leaving the regulation of the family to the states,
and instead assigned power to regulate marriage and divorce to the Commonwealth Parliament. In its list of enumerated powers assigned to the
Commonwealth Parliament and set out in Section 51, the Australian Constitution includes two provisions related to what, today, we call Family
Law: Section 51 (xxi) covers “Marriage,” and Section 51 (xxii) covers
“Divorce and matrimonial causes; and in relation thereto, parental rights,
and the custody and guardianship of infants.”6 After briefly considering
the broader structural context in which this divergence between the American and Australian approaches to family law were embedded, we explore
the constitutional deliberations that ultimately led to this grant of federal
power.
A. The Federalist Context of Family Law in Australia and the United
States
In their basic federalist design, the United States and Australian constitutions have much in common. They each embrace a federal scheme of
power sharing between nation and states, and these schemes have many
similar attributes. First, under both constitutions, the national government
gets only the legislative power expressly enumerated in the constitution or
understood to be implied by the constitution.7 Second, the states retain, as
residual powers, those powers not granted to the Commonwealth Parliament or the American Congress,8 and third, the states generally have concurrent power over the specified national subjects.9 Fourth, if a state law is
inconsistent with federal legislation in an area of concurrent power, the
federal law takes precedence.10 Fifth, both constitutions have been inter4. Id. at 80– 93. J. A. LA NAUZE, THE MAKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION 28
(1972).
5. Sir Owen Dixon, The Law and the Constitution, in JESTING PILATE 40, 44 (Severin
Howard Zichy Woinarski ed., 1965).
6. AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION S 51 (xxi)– (xxii).
7. Compare AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION S 51, with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
8. Compare AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION SS 107– 08, with U.S. CONST. amend. X.
9. Compare MICHAEL COPER, ENCOUNTERS WITH THE AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION
165– 66 (1987), with ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
390 (3d ed. 2006); see also Ernest A. Young, Dual Federalism, Concurrent Jurisdiction,
and the Foreign Affairs Exception, 69 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 139, 145 (2001) (defining “concurrent regulatory jurisdiction”).
10. Compare AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION S 109, with U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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preted to give a power of judicial review to the courts, with final reviewing
authority given to one supreme federal court authorized to interpret federal
laws and to enforce the federal constitution, including the division between
state and national power.11 Sixth, both constitutions require that full faith
and credit be given to “public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings” of
every state,12 and both include a legislative power to implement that
obligation.13
These similarities are qualified by significant differences, however.
On its list of legislative powers, the Australian constitution includes powers
referred from the states,14 creating an opportunity for state-to-federal
power shifts that has no parallel in the United States Constitution. In connection with the power of judicial review, there are two important distinctions that bear on the implementation of federalism in the two countries.
In the United States, the decentralization of power to the states is significantly limited by a robust Bill of Rights, which restricts state and local as
well as national government power and, more particularly, by the Fourteenth Amendment, which added federal protection of basic civil rights to
that of the states.15 By contrast, the Australian Constitution has few individual rights protections, and those protections which it does have are
often limited to restrictions on national power.16 On the other hand, in
Australia, state autonomy is qualified by the Australian High Court’s final
decision-making power over state and local law,17 whereas the United
States Supreme Court has no such power.18 Of course, enforcing and
applying constitutional provisions depend in large measure on how the
provisions are understood and interpreted, which in turn depends on the
values and the culture of the country in which the interpreting body acts.
Suffice it to say, with respect to American and Australian values and culture, much is shared and much is different.
11. Compare Australian Communist Party v. Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1, 262,
with Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 173 (1803).
12. Compare AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION S 118, with U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. The
wording in the respective constitutions is not identical; Australia’s provision adds “laws”
to those things to be recognized, and the recognition required is “throughout the Commonwealth,” whereas the required American Constitution requires that full faith and
credit be given “in each state.”
13. Compare AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION S 51 (xxv), with U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 2.
14. AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION S 51 (xxxvii).
15. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1297– 98, 1334– 35 (3d
ed. 2000).
16. See COPER, supra note 9, at 316– 58; LESLIE ZINES, THE HIGH COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 567– 95 (5th ed. 2008).
17. See AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION S 73; Kable v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions (1996) 189
CLR 51, 51 (limiting state regulation of state courts to keep consistent with federal
courts). Inglis Clark’s biographers have suggested that the Commonwealth’s general
power to review state law “in many ways . . . fills the gap left by the absence of Bill of
Rights clauses such as those in the United Sates Constitution.” F.M. NEASEY & L.J.
NEASEY, ANDREW INGLIS CLARK 139 (2001).
18. See DIXON, supra note 5, at 198– 99; William Buss, Alexander Meiklejohn, American Constitutional Law, and Australia’s Implied Freedom of Political Communication, 34
FED. L. REV. 421, 432– 33 (2006).
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B. Australia’s Family Law Deliberations in the Shadow of American
Federalism
Beginning with Clark’s proposed draft constitution in 1891, each of
the bills considered by the constitutional conventions included federal parliamentary power to regulate “Marriage and Divorce,” and this power was
not controversial until the debates at Sydney in 1897.19 Within those wideranging deliberations, there was a broad consensus that the state of divorce
law in the United States was something to be avoided.20 The Australian
framers were troubled by the proliferation of divergent standards among
the American states and the manipulation and uncertainty of the law that
ensued.21
While the framers appear to have shared their dislike of the American
constitutional state of affairs concerning divorce, they took various positions in the Sydney debates on the proper role for the Commonwealth Parliament in the regulation of marriage and divorce.22 Some favored Clark’s
original “Marriage and Divorce” language. At the other extreme were those
framers who opposed assigning the Commonwealth Parliament any power
over marriage and divorce. Finally, there were those who favored a proposal from the Tasmanian Assembly that would have limited the Commonwealth Parliament’s power to the regulation of interstate recognition of
marriage and divorce.23
The aim of those framers advocating national power over marriage
and divorce was to secure uniform divorce law across the Commonwealth.
“If there is one blot which stands out more than another in the American
Constitution,” one delegate contended, “it is that, by their Constitution,
they are not able to deal with this question in a uniform way; and we all
know that this has led to a condition of things socially of a most deplorable
character.”24 To this, another delegate responded, “A scandal!”25 Those
opposed to a uniform national law focused on their fear that granting the
Commonwealth Parliament authority over divorce would lead to a nationwide liberalization of divorce law because the two most populous and
nationally powerful states, New South Wales and Victoria, had the most
liberal divorce laws.26 Uniformity, it was feared, would impose those lib19. See Deb. of the Australasian Fed. Convention, Sydney, 22 Sept. 1897, 1077– 82
[hereinafter SYDNEY CONVENTION DEBATES]; WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 10, 144, 175, 223,
302, 422, 595 (describing the various stages of drafting the Australian Constitution).
20. See SYDNEY CONVENTION DEBATES, supra note 19, at 1077– 82.
21. See id. at 1078– 81 (Hon. R.E. O’Conner and Hon. Sir J.W. Downer).
22. See id. at 1077– 82.
23. See id. (Bernhard Wise, Esq., and Hon. C.H. Grant).
24. See id. at 1080 (Hon. R.E. O’Conner).
25. See id. (Josiah Symon, Esq.).
26. See id. at 1077– 81 (Patrick Glynn, Esq.) Patrick Glynn, on behalf of South Australia, made an impassioned speech against a national power to regulate divorce, pointing to a correlation between liberalized divorce laws and the frequency of divorces.
Glynn’s strongest case was New South Wales: between 1886 and 1890, there were 210
divorces while between 1891 and 1894, after divorce was rendered “exceedingly easy,”
there were 841 divorces. Id. at 1077– 78.
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eral laws on the states that wished to retain a restrictive approach to
divorce.
The Tasmanian compromise proposal would have given the Commonwealth Parliament authority to make all states respect the marriages and
divorces conferred by their sister states.27 This law resembled, but did not
purport to rely on, the Full Faith and Credit Clause that was already in the
then-current draft of the Australian constitution.28 The Tasmanian proposal was an attempt to find a middle ground. One of its supporters warned
against “introducing into the constitution anything which is likely to cause
a difference between the commonwealth and the states,” particularly with
respect to an issue such as divorce “about which stronger differences of
opinion may prevail” and which are not likely to be open to argument
“because they are based on sentiment and tradition.” At the same time, this
supporter noted the importance of the Commonwealth’s having sufficient
authority “to prevent scandals from people having one marital status in
one state and another status in another state.”29 Clark, himself a Tasmanian and also the original Australian proponent of the nationalization of
marriage and divorce, ultimately supported the Tasmanian compromise
out of concern that a national consensus on divorce could not be
achieved.30
Those arguing for uniformity of the laws in regard to marriage and
divorce rejected the compromise and warned against repeating “the condition of things which has obtained in America.”31 The advocates of uniformity prevailed at the convention, but the losers were correct in
anticipating that the issue of divorce would continue to divide the states
and that the new nation was not yet ready to reach consensus around a
single law.32 No significant Commonwealth law on marriage or divorce
was enacted for more than fifty years.33
In sharp contrast with the treatment of marriage and divorce, the proposal to give the Commonwealth Parliament power to regulate “parental
rights, and the custody and guardianship of infants” was presented to the
27. See id. at 1079 (Hon. Charles Grant).
28. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
29. See SYDNEY CONVENTION DEBATES, supra note 19, at 1078– 79, 1081 (Bernard
Wise, Esq.) (drawing upon a memorandum written by Inglis Clark).
30. In the memorandum cited by Wise, see supra note 29, Clark noted that Canada
had found it “impractical to legislate” a uniform national law of marriage and divorce.
He stated that “it is very certain that the several colonies with liberalized divorce laws
would strenuously resist change and that the colonies with conservative divorce law
would similarly not yield their current position.” WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 706.
31. See SYDNEY CONVENTION DEBATES, supra note 19, at 1080 (Hon. Richard
O’Connor) (“[B]y [the American] Constitution, they are not able to deal with this question in a uniform way; and we all know that this has led to a condition of things socially
of a most deplorable character”).
32. See supra note 29– 31 and accompanying text.
33. See HENRY FINLAY, TO HAVE BUT NOT TO HOLD: A HISTORY OF ATTITUDES TO MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN AUSTRALIA 1858– 1975, 286– 361 (2005); COPER, supra note 9, at
199.
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Australian framers for the first time in Adelaide on April 13, 1897.34 In
the subsequent debate on this provision in Sydney, a debate which followed the marriage and divorce debate, the argument against the parental
rights provision centered on states’ rights and “a decided objection . . . to
any federal interference with what the people conceive to be matters most
sacred in the family.”35 In this context, the counter argument for uniformity36 did not prevail.
With respect to parental rights, the framers who favored state control
stressed the unique ability of the states to be good decision makers because
they were “on the spot. . . . [and t]hey [had] opportunities of inquiring into
the relationship of the children and their parents, and into their condition
if they [were] destitute and neglected.”37 The issue of special concern
appears to have been the intrusion of the federal government into the relationship between parent and child,38 rather than the allocation of authority
between parents at issue in divorce proceedings– a distinction that roughly
correlates with the modern distinction between public and private custody
law.39
The leader of the 1897-98 convention and chair of the drafting committee, Edmund Barton, expressed concern about dividing authority to
deal with marriage and divorce from authority “to legislate as to the children, the issue of the marriage.”40 Where a custody dispute arose in connection with a divorce or separation, he described the complication that
would result for the judge administering “one law with respect to the issue
relating to divorce,” while the decree dealing with custody would “be under
a totally different and varying law.”41 Striking a compromise between
those who favored including authority over parental rights among the
Commonwealth Parliament’s powers and those who opposed such an
authorization of power, a proposal by Barton eliminated the separate
“parental rights” sub-clause and expanded the Marriage and Divorce subclause to give the Commonwealth power to regulate “marriage and divorce
34. See Deb. of the Australasian Fed. Convention, Adelaide, 12 Apr. 1897, 439
(Edmund Barton, Esq.).
35. See SYDNEY CONVENTION DEBATES, supra note 19, at 1082 (Hon. Joseph
Carruthers).
36. See id. at 1084 (Hon. John Downer) (“[W]hen we have given the most sacred of
all relations— the relation of marriage— over to the commonwealth . . . it follows, as a
matter of course, that we must [give parental rights over] to the commonwealth [so that
it can] pass a uniform law”).
37. See id. at 1084 (Hon. Charles Grant).
38. Those opposed to the parental rights provision contended that “the question of
parental rights is one which opens up a very large range of questions,” and warned that
“[w]e may have all sorts of interference between parents and their children under [this]
proposal.” See id. at 1082 (Hon. Joseph Carruthers).
39. See THE LAW AND CHILD DEVELOPMENT xii– xiii (Emily Buss & Mavis Maclean eds.,
2010) (explaining that private Family Law applies to relationships among private individuals, governing, for example, marriage and divorce, whereas public Family Law
applies where the state has a more direct involvement, governing, for example the child
protection system).
40. SYDNEY CONVENTION DEBATES, supra note 19, at 1083 (Edmund Barton, Esq.).
41. Id.
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and, in relation thereto, parental rights and the custody and guardianship
of infants.”42 Even as Barton forged this compromise, he promised that
“the other matters to which attention has been directed will be considered
by the Drafting Committee.”43 It is not clear whether the Drafting Committee ever did that.
What the Drafting Committee did do was change the substance of the
provision by again dividing the agreed upon single sub-clause into two subclauses: one that addressed only “marriage,” and a second that introduced
the technical concept of “matrimonial causes.”44 For the first time in the
evolving constitutional text, parental rights were linked only to divorce and
matrimonial causes; they were not linked to marriage. The transcript of
the convention debates records no discussion of the change in wording or
the change in meaning resulting from leaving the single word “Marriage”
alone in what became section 51(xxi), while making the subject of section
51(xxii) “divorce and matrimonial causes; and in relation thereto, parental
rights, and the custody and guardianship of infants.”45
Thus, the framers of the Australian Constitution purported to avoid
the “blot” on the American Constitution and the consequent scandal that
came from leaving regulation of an important, morally laden, domestic
relations issue to the several and diversely situated states. But they obviously achieved only partial uniformity. The unceremonious rejection of the
Drafting Committee’s original parental rights proposal reveals how narrowly the framers viewed the problem that called for a nationally uniform
solution and how grudgingly they allowed erosion of state autonomy. The
Australian framers, inspired by America’s problematic experience with
divorce, attempted a federalistic realignment focused narrowly on the problem of the day, rather than comprehensively working through the allocation of authority between state and nation in regulating family status.
42. Id. at 1035– 36, 1085 (proposing to eliminate the separate number designation
of the parental rights sub-clause and to insert “and in relation thereto” after “marriage
and divorce”).
43. Id. at 1085.
44. JOHN QUICK & ROBERT RANDOLPH GARRAN, THE ANNOTATED CONSTITUTION OF THE
AUSTRALIAN COMMONWEALTH (1901), reprinted in THE ANNOTATED CONSTITUTION OF THE
AUSTRALIAN COMMONWEALTH 611 (Legal Books 1995) [hereinafter QUICK & GARRAN].
Quick and Garran explain that the phrase “matrimonial causes” would cover those matters “subsidiary and consequential to marriage and divorce. They will naturally include
judicial separation, restitution of conjugal rights, nullity of marriage, jactitation, damages against an adulterer, and probably maintenance of wives and children and marriage
settlements.” Id. at 608.
45. In eventually approving these changes without considering their possible purpose or effect, the convention seemed implicitly to reject Josiah Symon’s argument that
parent-children matters were “consequent upon marriage” and “might depend simply on
marriage” and that, therefore, it might be better “to leave the subclause as it is and
consider the matter further later on.” SYDNEY CONVENTION DEBATES, supra note 19, at
1083 (Josiah Symon, Esq.). But see Attorney-General (Vic) v. Commonwealth (Marriage
Act Case) (1962) 107 CLR 529, 554 (vindicating Symon’s position by refusing to read
section 51(xxii) as a limitation of section 51(xxi) and relying on the pervasive connections of marriage and parenting).
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II. The Development of Divorce under the Two Federalist Regimes
The stories of the development of divorce law in Australia and the
United States over the course of the twentieth century are in some senses
strikingly similar. Both countries inherited an English tradition of a right
to travel manifested in their populations’ actual mobility.46 This mobility,
in turn, led to interstate legal uncertainties, both about the right to travel to
take advantage of another state’s law, and about the obligation of another
state to recognize and apply a sister state’s divorce law. In 1900, in both
countries, divorce was regulated by the states, and the diverging
approaches taken among the states exacerbated uncertainties and related
problems.47 By 1980, both countries had developed a fairly uniform
approach to divorce that reduced those problems considerably; this
approach was no-fault divorce.48
But the difference in federalism design in the United States and Australia took the development of divorce law on different paths, paths that
reveal some of the tradeoffs associated with their two approaches and that
capture important shifts in their family law specific federalism designs that
took place over time. In the United States, the development of its full faith
and credit doctrine brought substantial stability and predictability to a
state-based system of divorce regulation, even as the states diverged widely
in their approaches to divorce. In Australia, stability and predictability
around the issue of divorce was eventually achieved through the enactment
of national laws, though these enactments introduced new problems
because legal authority over various family law matters became awkwardly
divided between state and nation. To some extent these problems of statefederal fragmentation have been addressed in Australia by shifting additional authority over family law to the Commonwealth Parliament through
the referral power.
A. The Twentieth Century Development of Divorce Law in the United
States
The Australian framers had the American story basically right. By the
mid-Nineteenth Century, divorce laws among the American states had
diverged considerably on both the permissible grounds for divorce (still
fault-based in all states) and on the period of in-state residency required to
46. Jack P. Greene, Introduction: Empire and Liberty, in EXCLUSIONARY EMPIRE:
ENGLISH LIBERTIES OVERSEAS 1600– 1900 1, 3 (Jack P. Greene ed., 2010).
47. See FINLAY, supra note 33, at 288– 89, 291; see generally id. at 102– 284 (surveying
the state regulation of divorce in Australia from the late 1800s to mid– 1900s). See Ann
Laquer Estin, Family Law Federalism: Divorce and the Constitution, 16 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 381, 382– 85, 387, 394, 419 (2007) (analyzing the evolution of divorce in the
United States).
48. See Estin, supra note 47, at 391 n.72, 406; Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of
Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. Rev. 1443, 1472 (1992). See BELINDA FEHLBERG & JULIET BEHRENS, AUSTRALIAN FAMILY LAW: THE CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT 119, 640 (2009); Richard
Ingleby, Matrimonial Breakdown and the Legal Process: The Limitations of No-Fault
Divorce, 11 L. & POL’Y 1, 1, 10 (1989).
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obtain a divorce.49 People traveled out of state to obtain a divorce which
they could not obtain in their home state, and when they returned, the
validity of their divorce was sometimes challenged.50 Many Americans,
like the Australian constitutional framers, were scandalized by this state of
affairs. By the time Australia was drafting its Constitution, a conservative
American backlash inspired by a spike in the divorce rate and a growing
concern about forum shopping led to the implementation of more restrictive divorce laws in many states, laws which limited access to divorce and
prevented extra-territorial, “migratory divorces” from being recognized.51
At the same time as Australia granted its federal parliament authority
to regulate divorce, there was a call in the United States for the enactment
of uniform laws for marriage and divorce.52 And year after year, through
the first several decades of the Twentieth century, some member of Congress proposed a constitutional amendment that would give Congress
authority to regulate marriage and divorce.53 In one sense, the call for
national uniformity looked identical to that of the Australian framers,
based as it was on “the evils growing out of the diversity of the laws of the
different States, and the different views taken by the several State courts as
to proper grounds of jurisdiction in divorce cases [which] have been the
subject of much discussion and much anxiety.”54 However, in another
sense, it was noticeably different: those opposed to liberalization drove the
impetus for national uniformity in the United States on the assumption
that a national law would be a more restrictive law.55 This was because the
first movers in the liberalization trend, including states such as Nevada,
Indiana, and North and South Dakota,56 were not, as in Australia, the populous states holding the majority of the United States’ population. Efforts
to secure national uniformity can be understood as an attempt to unify the
country’s laws around majority views in order to better resist the pressure
coming from the outliers.
49. See NELSON MANFRED BLAKE, THE ROAD TO RENO: A HISTORY OF DIVORCE IN THE
UNITED STATES 80, 82, 117– 19 (1962).
50. While migratory divorces received a great deal of attention and caused special
legal problems, they represented a small percentage of the total divorces obtained. See,
e.g., Ernest R. Groves, Migratory Divorces, 2 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 293, 293 (1935) (noting that those traveling out of state to seek a divorce represent a “small portion of those
who seek release from marriage ties through court procedure”).
51. See Estin, supra note 47, at 390. In an effort to harmonize state laws around a
more restrictive norm, conservatives also called for a cooperative state effort to promulgate uniform divorce laws. In 1907, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) proposed a uniform statute that denied recognition to any
out-of-state divorce entered on grounds that would not be available in the forum state.
Despite these efforts, few states signed on to the statute. Id. at 391.
52. See BLAKE, supra note 49, at 133.
53. See Edward Stein, Past and Present Amendments to the United States Constitution
Regarding Marriage, 82 WASH. U. L. Q. 611, 627, 638 (2004); see Estin, supra note 47, at
390.
54. Caroll Davidson Wright, Comm. of Labor, A REPORT ON MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
IN THE UNITED STATES, 1867 TO 1886 11 (1897).
55. See BLAKE, supra note 49, at 130– 31, 133.
56. See id. at 119, 122– 23; see Lawrence M. Friedman, A Dead Language: Divorce Law
and Practice Before No-Fault, 86 VA. L. REV. 1497, 1504– 05 (2000).

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\48-1\CIN103.txt

116

unknown

Seq: 12

1-JUL-15

Cornell International Law Journal

14:20

Vol. 48

While these efforts to nationalize the law of marriage and divorce did
not succeed in the United States, they demonstrate two interrelated points
that bear on our comparative analysis. First, these efforts demonstrate that
there was some chafing under the United States’s federalism design. That
is, around the time of the Australian Constitutional founding, many Americans believed that the state-based system, at least as it applied to divorce,
was a mistake. Second, in the face of this prevalent belief and the difficulty
of constitutional amendment, the United States Constitution imposed a
significant constraint on any attempt to move toward the national regulation of divorce.
Over the course of the next several decades, three interrelated trends
overwhelmed efforts to contain the liberalization of divorce. The first
trend was the increase in the actual divorce rate. The second was the
expansion of grounds for divorce recognized by the states. The third trend
was an increase in the interstate enforcement of other states’ divorce judgments. We mention the first and second trends briefly, and then focus
some attention on the third, as it bears most directly on our consideration
of the United States’ federalism design.
The rate of divorce in the United States increased slowly over the
course of the first half of the twentieth century and then increased sharply
between 1960 and 1980.57 Although conventional wisdom would attribute
this sharp increase to the change in the laws, there is at least as much
empirical support for the opposite conclusion: that increasing divorce rates
fueled divorce law reform.58 While the primary direction of causation
between these two trends is hotly contested, there is no dispute that the
divorce rate began its sharp increase before the dramatic legal reforms
occurred. To get around fault requirements, couples routinely fabricated
evidence of cruelty and adultery. Bringing the law on the books in line
with the reality of people’s lives was in fact a central justification for

57. While the divorce rate over the first half of the century increased from 4.1
divorces among 1000 married women in 1900 to 8.9 divorces among 1000 in 1958,
there was a significant spike in divorce in the 1940s, climbing as high as 17.9 in 1000 in
1946 before falling back down. Between 1960 and 1980, the divorce rate rose steadily
from 9.2 to 22.6 per 1000 married women, peaking at 22.8 per 1000 in 1979. U.S.
Dep’t of Health & Hum. Serv., Nat’l Ctr. For Health Stat., Advance Report of Final Divorce
Statistics, 39 MONTHLY VITAL STATISTICS REPORT 1, 7 (1991), available at http://www.cdc
.gov/nchs/data/mvsr/supp/mv39_12s2.pdf; U.S. Dep’t of Health, Educ., & Welfare,
Nat’l Ctr. for Health Stat., 100 Years of Marriage and Divorce Statistics: United States,
1867– 1967, 24 (1973), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_21/sr21_
024.pdf.
58. Compare Ira Mark Ellman & Sharon L. Lohr, Dissolving the Relationship Between
Divorce Laws and Divorce Rates, 18 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 341, 358 (1998), and Ira Mark
Ellman, Divorce Rates, Marriage Rates, and the Problematic Persistence of Traditional Marital Roles, 34 FAM L Q. 1, 5 (2000), with Margaret F. Brinig and F.H. Buckley, No-Fault
Laws and At-Fault People, 18 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 325, 339 (1998), and Leora Friedberg,
Did Unilateral Divorce Raise Divorce Rates? Evidence from Panel Data, 88 AM. ECON. REV.
608, 620 (1998).
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reform.59
Pressed by changes in society’s attitudes about divorce, states began
introducing grounds for divorce that lacked a basis in fault as early as the
1930s.60 During this period, many states were acting as “laboratories for
experimentation” with the law of divorce, while other states were learning
from those experiments.61 “Incompatibility” was added to New Mexico’s
list of grounds for divorce, and other states followed.62 By 1950, nearly
half the states allowed divorce when a couple had lived apart for a period
of time, though those time periods could be as long as a decade.63 But it
was not until 1969 that the first state, California, substituted “irreconcilable differences” for its list of fault-based grounds for divorce, a step that
was swiftly followed by several other states.64In the next ten years, most of
the remaining states adopted some version of no-fault divorce and, by
1985, all had done so, though New York did not expand the availability of
no-fault to “unilateral” divorce until 2010.65
1. Full Faith and Credit
Paralleling these developments in practice and substantive law was the
Supreme Court’s evolving interpretation of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause.66 Indeed, to a large extent, the story of interstate coordination of
family law in the United States is the story of the Supreme Court’s gradual
development of the full faith and credit doctrine.67
As early as 1869, the Supreme Court determined that the Full Faith
and Credit Clause required the District of Columbia to recognize a divorce
decree validly entered in Indiana.68 The Court reasoned that divorce
decrees were judgments, and in earlier cases69 it had made clear that states
59. See Friedman, supra note 56, at 1531 (“The experts kept trying to reform the
official law, to make it conform to what they considered social realities. They wanted,
naturally enough, to get rid of the perjury, the chicanery, and the lying.”).
60. Id. at 1527, 1533.
61. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the
Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”)
62. See Estin, supra note 47, at 394.
63. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE 20TH CENTURY 441 (2002).
64. JOANNA L. GROSSMAN & LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, INSIDE THE CASTLE: LAW AND THE
FAMILY IN 20TH CENTURY AMERICA 176– 77 (2011). During this period, the NCCUSL,
which, early in the twentieth century had pushed unsuccessfully for restrictive divorce
rules, drafted the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, embracing no-fault divorce based
on a finding that a marriage was “irretrievably broken” in the eyes of one spouse.
65. Id. at 177– 78.
66. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to
the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general laws prescribe the manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof”).
67. Estin, supra note 47, at 396– 406.
68. Cheever v. Wilson, 76 U.S. (9 Wall) 108, 123– 24 (1869).
69. See, e.g., Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481 (1813).
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were required, under constitutional and statutory full faith and credit provisions,70 to give out-of-state judgments the same effect those judgments
would be given in their states of issuance. “If a [divorce] judgment is conclusive in a State where it is rendered,” the Court declared in Cheever v.
Wilson, “it is equally conclusive everywhere in the courts of the United
States,” regardless of the place of marriage, the place of marital fault, or the
domicile of the non-petitioning spouse.71 By the end of the nineteenth century, other states widely recognized ex parte divorce decrees issued by a
court in the petitioner’s state of domicile, with the exception of a few states
that had especially strict divorce laws.72
But then in 1906, when the nationwide controversy over divorce in
general and migratory divorce in particular was in full swing, the Supreme
Court introduced a confounding qualification to its application of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause in the context of divorce. The Court concluded
that, where an ex parte petitioner’s domicile in the divorce-granting state
was achieved through marital fault, other states had no obligation to recognize the divorce.73 Thus, in Haddock v. Haddock, Mr. Haddock’s Connecticut divorce was found to have been validly ignored in New York, because
his establishment of domicile in Connecticut was associated with his abandonment of his New York wife.74 The Court did not question Connecticut’s
70. There is a substantial body of scholarship acknowledging the uncertainty about
whether and to what extent the Full Faith and Credit Clause was intended to create a
self-executing obligation on the forum state to apply the law of a sister state or merely
imposed an evidentiary obligation to recognize that the legal action in question had
been taken in another state. See generally David P. Currie, The Constitution and the
Supreme Court: Full Faith and the Bill of Rights, 1889– 1910, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 867
(1985); David Engdahl, The Classic Rule of Faith and Credit, 118 YALE L.J. 1584 (2009);
Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249 (1992); Kurt H. Nadelmann, Full Faith
and Credit to Judgments and Public Acts: A Historical-Analytical Reappraisal, 56 MICH. L.
REV. 33 (1957); Stephen E. Sachs, Full Faith and Credit in the Early Congress, 95 VA. L.
REV. 1201 (2009); Ralph U. Whitten, The Original Understanding of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause and the Defense of Marriage Act, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 255 (1998); Charles
M. Yablon, Madison’s Full Faith and Credit Clause: A Historical Analysis, 33 CARDOZO L.
REV. 125 (2011).
The Supreme Court began eliminating that uncertainty in Mills v. Duryee when it held
that the forum state was required to give the same effect to out-of-state judgments as they
would be afforded in the state in which judgment was entered, emphasizing the Act of
Congress implementing the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Mills, 11 US (7 Cranch) at
483– 84 (explaining that, in the Act of 26th of May, 1790, ch. 11, “[C]ongress provided
for the mode of authenticating the records and judicial proceedings of the state Courts,
and then further declared that the records and judicial proceedings, authenticated as
aforesaid, shall have such faith and credit given to them in every Court within the United
States as they have by the law or usage in the Courts of the state from whence the said
records are or shall be taken”). This statutory interpretation was eventually incorporated into the Court’s interpretation of the constitutional language as well, affording
special protection to out-of-state judgments, (or “judicial proceedings,” in the language
of the Clause). See, e.g., Chi. & Alton R.R. v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 119 U.S. 615 (1887);
see generally, Whitten, supra, at 332– 46.
71. Cheever, 76 U.S. (9 Wall) at 123.
72. Estin, supra note 47, at 387.
73. Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 604– 06 (1906).
74. Id.
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authority to grant the husband’s ex parte petition for divorce, as that was a
matter of Connecticut state law, but it nevertheless allowed New York to
refuse to recognize the decree based on its assessment of the husband’s
fault. Mr. Haddock was thus a divorced man in Connecticut but a married
man in New York. In his dissent, Justice Holmes expressed his concern
that the ruling was “likely to cause considerable disaster to innocent persons and to bastardize children hitherto supposed to be the offspring of a
lawful marriage;”75 a concern shared by many critics of the Haddock
opinion.76
So stood the constitutional law of Full Faith and Credit in the United
States for the next several decades, complicated and confused by the question of marital fault. As the attitudes and laws governing divorce gradually
shifted, however, the “rules and exceptions spawned by Haddock grew
steadily more complicated,”77and the marital fault exception to the full
faith and credit requirement was finally abandoned by the Court in 1942.
In Williams v. North Carolina (Williams I),78 the Court determined that
North Carolina was obligated by the Full Faith and Credit Clause to recognize Nevada’s ex parte divorce decree, so long as the petitioning party had
established domicile according to the law of the divorce-granting state.
Thus, nearly a century later, the Supreme Court circled back to its position
in Cheever, reading the Full Faith and Credit Clause to promote interstate
clarity and consistency, without regard to interstate differences in divorce
policy.
While this reading of the Full Faith and Credit Clause remains in force
today, two new qualifications were introduced by the Court shortly after
Williams I was decided. The first qualification, introduced in a subsequent
stage of the litigation (Williams II) allows a state to avoid the enforcement
obligation where it finds, based on a challenge brought by the divorceopposing spouse, that the divorce-granting state did not have jurisdiction
over the petitioner.79 This is so, the Court explained, even where the
divorce remains valid in the divorce-granting state because the decree is not
subject there to collateral attack.80 Thus, after Williams II, Mr. Williams,
like Mr. Haddock, was divorced in one state (Nevada), but not in another
(North Carolina). And this time Holmes’s parade of horribles was not
75. Haddock, 201 U.S. at 628 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
76. See Ernst Freund, Unifying Tendencies in American Legislation, 22 YALE L.J. 96,
108– 09 (1912) (discussing how Haddock’s non-recognition would lead to undesirable
confusion about the status of parties who are rightfully married in one State, and guilty
of bigamy in another); see also McCormick v. McCormick, 107 P. 546, 550 (Kan. 1910)
(explaining that the Kansas state legislature, for the “purpose of avoiding any possible
disaster . . . caused by misapprehension of the doctrine,” enacted legislation making
divorce decrees in any U.S. state enforceable in Kansas).
77. Estin, supra note 47, at 389.
78. Williams v. North Carolina (Williams I), 317 U.S. 287, 302– 04 (1942).
79. Williams v. North Carolina (Williams II), 325 U.S. 226, 229– 30 (1945). This
qualification of the full faith and credit obligation was further limited to cases in which
the non-petitioning spouse had not appeared. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 348– 52
(1948).
80. Williams II, 325 U.S. at 233– 34.

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\48-1\CIN103.txt

120

unknown

Seq: 16

1-JUL-15

Cornell International Law Journal

14:20

Vol. 48

merely speculative: Mr. Williams and his new wife were convicted of bigamy in North Carolina.81 Despite this troublesome consequence, there is a
coherent rationale behind the Williams II qualification to the full faith and
credit obligation. Where an individual travels to another state for the sole,
“evasive,” purpose of obtaining a divorce that he could not obtain in his
home state, he is in effect selecting the law of his choosing, and importing
a legal status that is against the public policy of the state in which he lives.
This sort of self-interested selection is particularly problematic if it conflicts with the interests of the other party, who is opposed to the divorce.
The second qualification to the full faith and credit obligation
imposed on the states concerns the scope of the divorce judgment. Shortly
after Williams II, the Supreme Court issued two decisions endorsing the
concept of “divisible divorce,” under which the Full Faith and Credit
Clause applied to the decree of divorce itself, but not to related orders concerning spousal support.82 Divisible divorce ensured that an individual’s
marital status remained clear and consistent across states, while protecting
both the non-petitioning spouse’s interest in being heard and the state’s
interest in resolving issues of its “dominant concern,” such as ensuring
that its divorced domiciliaries not be left impoverished.83 In a separate
line of cases, the Supreme Court ruled that sister state child custody orders
need not be enforced by a forum state as part of the sister states’ divorce
decrees.84 While these rulings rested in part on the distinct jurisdictional
questions raised in the custody context,85 full faith and credit was found,
more generally, not to bar the reconsideration of custody orders which
were in all states non-final orders. Because these custody orders could be
revisited in the state of origin, the Court reasoned, another court could
similarly revisit the order without thwarting its full faith and credit
obligations.86
However justified this bifurcated approach was, it nevertheless perpetuated the problems of legal instability and uncertainty engendered by
America’s state-based authority over the law of divorce. The need for interstate coordination of custody orders led to an attempt to develop uniform
state laws and, ultimately, to the expansion of federal legislation implementing the Full Faith and Credit Clause to require interstate enforcement
of custody orders.87 Similarly, a uniform state law concerning the enforce81. Id. at 226.
82. Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 549 (1948) (“The result in this situation is to make
the divorce divisible— to give effect to the Nevada decree insofar as it affects marital
status and to make it ineffective on the issue of alimony”); see also Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957).
83. Estin, 334 U.S. at 547, 549.
84. See May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533– 34 (1953). See also Kovacs v. Brewer,
356 U.S. 604, 607– 08 (1958); New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 613– 15
(1947).
85. See May, 345 U.S. at 530– 33.
86. See Halvey, 330 U.S. at 613– 15; see also Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187, 192 (1962).
87. The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act of 1968, which was adopted by all
states in some form by 1981, was intended to ensure interstate stability for custody
orders. However, continuing uncertainties caused by multiple states’ concurrent juris-
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ment of child support orders was supplemented by a federal law directing
states to enforce other states’ child support orders;88 that federal law, too,
was grounded on Congress’s constitutional authority to enact legislation
implementing the full faith and credit obligation.89 Notably, it is only in
the area of family law that Congress has invoked its legislative authority
under the Clause to ensure interstate coordination.90
By the last quarter of the twentieth century, nationwide support for
liberalized divorce laws was manifest in their enactment and subsequent
stability in all fifty states.91 By leaving marriage and divorce to the states,
and thus rejecting national uniformity,92 the Americans did get the benefit
of the state-based laboratories for experimentation. And at least with
respect to divorce, which was the driving force for uniformity in Australia
in 1897, the several states in the United States slowly but surely moved
from widely divergent experiments to a consensus favoring no-fault
divorce. Even judged by Australia’s own standard, in the long run the
American design produced a largely uniform law of divorce throughout the
nation. But states achieved this rough uniformity with a great deal of help
from both the federal courts, which enforced the states’ obligation to give
one another’s decisions full faith and credit, and Congress, which, pursuant to the second sentence of the clause, expanded the reach of the full
faith and credit obligation beyond that found to be required by the courts.
And the state-to-state uniformity is still incomplete. Some state-to-state discrepancies remain in the detail of divorce law that could at least theoretidiction to modify custody decrees under the Act led Congress to enact the Parental Kidnapping and Prevention Act of 1980 (PKPA), 28 U.S.C. § 1738A, which required states
to give full faith and credit to the first state to enter a custody decree. Most states have
subsequently adopted the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act,
which mimics the language of the PKPA. See Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement
Act Summary, THE NAT’L CONF.OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM ST. LAWS, http://www
.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Child%20Custody%20Jurisdiction%20and%20Enforce
ment%20Act (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
88. See Laura W. Morgan, Pre-Emption or Abdication? Courts Rule Federal Law
Trumps State Law in Child Support Jurisdiction, 24 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 217,
217– 21 (2011).
89. See id.
90. In addition to the discussed enactments addressing child custody and child support, Congress has invoked its authority under the Full Faith and Credit Clause to compel interstate recognition of protective orders in the domestic violence context. 18 U.S.C.
§ 2265 (2014) (full faith and credit given to protection orders). Congress has also relied
on the clause to compel state recognition of tribal judgments (in contrast to our statement about interstate (state-to-state) recognition), both in the child custody context and
concerning non-family law matters. 25 U.S.C. § 1911 (2014) (providing for full faith
and credit to tribal child custody proceedings); 25 U.S.C. § 2207 (2014) (providing for
full faith and credit to tribal actions under tribal ordinances limiting descent and distribution of trust or restricted and controlled lands).
91. See Denese Ashbaugh Vlosky & Pamela A. Monroe, The Effective Dates of NoFault Divorce Laws in the 50 States, 51 FAM. REL. 317, 317 (2002); Frank F. Furstenberg,
Jr., History and Current Status of Divorce in the United States, 4 CHILD. & DIVORCE 29, 34
(1994).
92. See Sylvia A. Law, The Founders on Families, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 583, 586 (1987)
(“Virtually nothing in the original [United States] constitutional debates directly
addresses the situation of women and families “).
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cally encourage forum shopping and related legal instability.93 A bit of
America’s nineteenth century “scandal” survives, albeit in a much weakened state.
B. The Twentieth Century Development of Divorce Law in Australia
Although the Commonwealth Parliament had the constitutional
authority over marriage and divorce that the United States Congress
lacked, it did not exercise that authority for several decades.94 Two sorts of
constraints, both anticipated in the Convention Debates, encumbered Australia’s achievement of a national uniform law of divorce.
The first constraint imposed on the achievement of uniformity was
political in nature. True to the prediction of those opposed to nationalizing
the power over divorce, the enactment of a uniform divorce law proved to
be politically controversial; indeed, it was too politically controversial to be
pursued by the new Commonwealth government.95 The other constraint
on achieving uniformity was imposed by the framers themselves: in defining the scope of federal authority narrowly, with specific language (“marriage,” “divorce,” and “matrimonial causes”) tied to the particular concerns
of the day, the framers withheld from the Commonwealth Parliament
authority over all family law issues not sufficiently related to those
terms.96
In the absence of federal legislation in the first half of the twentieth
century, the Australian states relied on their concurrent power to regulate
divorce and progressed in much the same way as their American counterparts. Based on English law, divorce law in the Australian colonies originally provided only one ground for divorce, adultery, and required a
woman seeking divorce to prove much more (repeated or aggravated acts
by her husband) than a man had to prove (one incident by his wife).97 At
the time of the constitutional conventions in the last decade of the nineteenth century, those Australian states charged with making divorce
“exceedingly easy”98 had only added the fault grounds of desertion for
three years, habitual drunkenness, and imprisonment (and, in the case of
New South Wales, the equalization of the adultery standard for men and
93. See Williams v. Williams, 61 Va. App. 170, 178– 79 (Va. Ct. App. 2012) (refusing
modification of a divorce decree entered in another state, and citing policy grounds
against forum-shopping).
94. See ANTHONY DICKEY, FAMILY LAW 14 (5th ed. 2007).
95. See Henry Finlay, Caught in a Time Warp, Australian Family Law: A Split Jurisdiction, 19– 20 (2000), http://www.familylawwebguide.com.au/library/spca/docs/Caught
%20in%20a%20Time%20Warp%20-%20Australian%20Family%20Law.pdf (describing
Tasmanian Senator Henry Dobson’s introduction of the Matrimonial Causes Bill in the
first Commonwealth Parliament, and the virulent backlash it inspired); Sir Garfield Barwick, Some Aspects of the New Matrimonial Causes Act, 3 Sydney L. Rev. 409, 411– 12
(1961) (noting that the absence of legislation in the early days under the Constitution
was anticipated by the convention debates).
96. See Augusto Zimmerman, The Constitutionality of Same-Sex Marriage in Australia
(and Other Related Issues), 27 BYU J. PUB. L. 465, 473– 75 (2012).
97. Finlay, supra note 95, at 2– 3.
98. See SYDNEY CONVENTION DEBATES, supra note 19, at 1077 (Patrick Glynn, Esq.).
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women).99
Over the first several decades of the twentieth century, various states
added several additional grounds, creating some of the inconsistencies and
uncertainties that the framers had hoped to avoid with a national law.100
But the interstate distinctions in divorce law, and the interstate conflicts
they generated, were understood to be far less stark than those observed in
the United States.101 This lesser level of interstate conflict might account
for the lack of any significant development of American-style full faith and
credit doctrine as a means of addressing those conflicts.102 Moreover,
while there was some scholarly criticism of the Australian courts’ failure to
apply the full faith and credit doctrine to interstate divorce conflicts,103 the
significance of that omission was largely rendered moot when Parliament
enacted the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1959 and the Marriage Act of 1961.
Under the Matrimonial Causes Act, the Commonwealth included all of
the grounds for divorce that existed at that time, collectively, in all of the
states. Nationalization was thus, at first, largely a pooling mechanism.
Significant among those fourteen grounds was separation of five years or
more with no reasonable likelihood of resuming cohabitation, a ground
that had, before 1959, been recognized only in South Australia and Western Australia, and, as in the United States, was a clear step in the direction
of no-fault divorce.104 This initial legislation was enforced through the
state courts, as there were no general federal courts (other than the High
Court itself) at the time of its enactment.105 Thus, even after the law was
99. Finlay, supra note 95, at 2– 3.
100. See id. at 21.
101. Harris v Harris [1947] V.L.R. 44, 58. (“In Australia the substantive law and the
procedure in matters of divorce differ among the States, but the differences are trifling
in comparison with those which exist in the United States”); P.H. LANE, THE AUSTRALIAN
FEDERAL SYSTEM 918 (2d ed. 1979) (highlighting the Victorian Supreme Court’s conclusion in Harris); Zelman Cowen, Full Faith and Credit, The Australian Experience, 6 RES
JUDICATAE 27, 46 (1953) (“In Australia [in contrast to the United States], although the
bulk of divorce laws have been enacted by the several states, there are, at present, no
diversities comparable to those existing in America”).
102. But see Harris v Harris [1947] V.L.R. 44, 58. There, the Victoria Supreme Court
seemed to apply the doctrine more strictly than the United States Supreme Court had
done in Williams II, see supra note 79 and accompanying text. The decision triggered a
debate on paper between the then Deans of Melbourne University Law School and
Harvard Law School. Compare Zelman Cowen, The Recognition of Foreign Judgments
under a Full Faith and Credit Clause, 2 THE INT’L L. Q. 21, 23– 25 (1948), and Cowen, Full
Faith and Credit: The Australian Experience, supra note 101, at 47– 48, with Erwin Griswold, Divorce Jurisdiction and Recognition of Divorce Decrees – A Comparative Study, 65
HARV. L. REV. 193, 221– 22 (1951).
103. See Cowen, Full Faith and Credit: The Australian Experience, supra note 101, at
27– 29.
104. Finlay, supra note 95, at 21– 22 (“The five year separation ground was the most
noteworthy advance in the development of divorce”).
105. Id. at 22– 23; LESLIE ZINES, COWEN AND ZINES’S FEDERAL JURISDICTION IN AUSTRALIA
110– 11 (3d ed. 2002); ENID CAMPBELL & H.P. LEE, THE AUSTRALIAN JUDICIARY 12– 13
(2001). Parliament gave federal jurisdiction over these Acts to the state courts, pursuant
to its power under sections 71 and 77(iii). This power was explained at the Melbourne
sitting of the 1897– 98 convention as a power designed to get “rid of the doubt that was
raised in the United States.” William G. Buss, Andrew Inglis Clark’s Draft Constitution,
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nationalized, state courts continued to oversee all divorce proceedings,
potentially introducing some local diversity into the application of the federal law.
In 1975, the Commonwealth Parliament dramatically changed both
the procedural and substantive law of divorce. With its establishment of
the federal Family Court of Australia (FCA), Parliament shifted primary
enforcement of national divorce laws from state to federal court.106 At the
same time as it accomplished this procedural shift, Parliament abandoned
fault-based grounds for divorce altogether and adopted a no-fault federal
substantive standard. Irretrievable breakdown as evidenced by a short
period of separation became the national uniform standard for obtaining a
divorce in Australia.107 While some of the framers presciently anticipated
the shift to national no-fault divorce,108 this shift in the law did not occur
until seventy-five years after the scandalous state of divorce in America
inspired them to press for national power and six years after California
became the first state in the United States to pass a nearly identical no-fault
law.109
Australia and the United States transformed their divorce regimes into
no-fault regimes at roughly the same time, but Australia’s national legislation, true to its framers’ vision, secured a national uniformity that preceded
the emergence of the United States’ nationwide consensus and, to this day,
exceeds the level of uniformity achieved through that consensus in the
United States. Moreover, by establishing the Family Court of Australia,
Parliament encouraged the uniform interpretation of its national law
throughout the country.110 These changes in substantive and procedural
and the Assist from Article III of the Constitution of the United States, 33 MELB. U. L. REV.
718, 734– 39 (2009).
106. See CAMPBELL & LEE, supra note 105, at 13. . The Family Court of Australia is a
Chapter III federal court created by the Commonwealth Parliament under section 71,
with judicial independence provided under section 72(ii) and (iii). Family Court of Australia Background, FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA, http://www.familycourt.gov.au/wps/
wcm/connect/FCOA/home/about/FCoA/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2015); AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION ss 71, 72(ii), (iii). No such court exists in the United States. While one could
be created under Article III, Section 1, its jurisdiction (and thus its justification for
existing) would be severely limited by the general lack of enumerated federal legislative
power over family law matters. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
107. See Finlay, supra note 95, at 24– 25; Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 48– 49 (Austl.).
108. For example, Charles Grant said it would be “intolerable” for spouses who cannot maintain friendly relations to “be compelled by law to make a semblance of doing
so, and both lives be in effect wasted.” SYDNEY CONVENTION DEBATES, supra note 19, at
1080 (Hon. Charles Grant); see id. at 1078 (Hon. Isaac Isaacs) (“These laws [complained
about by Glynn] were introduced for the purpose of separating people who were not
suited to each other”); see id. at 1081 (Hon. John Downer) (“I can understand the position of those who say there should not be divorce from any cause at all; but all that is
past and gone, and we will not allow the domination of any church to interfere with
these relations”).
109. Family Law Act of 1969, ch. 1608, 1969 Cal. Stat. 3312, 3314– 51 (codified as
amended at Cal. Civ. Code ss 4000– 5100 (West 1983 & Supp. 1987)).
110. This uniform interpretation is potentially qualified by the continuing, though
limited, jurisdiction of state court enforcement of federal family law, jurisdiction that is
currently present only through the Family Court of Western Australia and subject to
review by the Family Court of Australia. International and Constitutional Settings– The
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law went a long way in establishing uniform federal family law in Australia.
But, in creating greater national uniformity in the law of marriage and
divorce in particular, the Commonwealth Parliament opened a divide
between state and federal family law more generally.
We know from the convention debates that the framers did not intend
to make all of what came to be known as “family law” a national subject.111
We know, also, that while Sir Edmund Barton, as chair of the drafting committee, anticipated that further attention was required to determine how to
strike the proper balance between state and national power in this area,
there is no evidence in the record of any such further attention.112 The
regulation of family law in Australia was thus divided between the federal
government for matters covered by sections 51(xxi) and (xxii) and the state
governments for everything else.113 When the Commonwealth enacted the
Family Law Act (“FLA”) in 1975, the Act’s ambitious title belied the constitutional limits imposed on Parliament’s authority. To avoid finding that
some parts of the law were unconstitutional, the High Court “read down”
both (1) provisions defining “children of the marriage” to apply only to
genetic and adopted children of both parties to the marriage, and (2) provisions covering property of one or both married parties to cover only those
disputes in which the property claim was tied to a divorce or decree of
nullity.114
After 1975, disputes concerning the common children of married
couples were covered by the FLA and resolved by the Family Court of Australia, whereas disputes concerning step-children or children born to
unmarried couples were covered by state law and adjudicated in state
courts.115 Similarly, property disputes directly tied to a couple’s marriage
or divorce were adjudicated under the FLA by the Family Court of Australia, whereas other property disputes, including some disputes between a
married couple as well as those involving unmarried couples and third parties, were tried under state law in state courts.116 It was hard enough that
different federal and state laws applied to these closely related sets of
issues when a family’s entire dispute could be tried in one court or the
Context for Reform, AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, http://www.alrc.gov.au/publications/2.%20International%20and%20Constitutional%20Settings%20%E2%80%94
The%20Context%20for%20Reform/constitutional-fra# (last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
111. See supra notes 34– 45 and accompanying text.
112. See SYDNEY CONVENTION DEBATES, supra note 19, at 1083 (Hon. Edmund Barton).
113. AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION, s 51 (xxi), (xxii).
114. See generally FEHLBERG & BEHRENS, supra note 48, at 24– 27 (summarizing the
High Court’s holding in Russell v. Russell (1976) 134 CLR 495, along with subsequent
case history).
115. Id. at 32– 33; DICKEY, supra note 94, at 26– 27. See also COPER, supra note 9, at
198– 99 (“No rational scheme would contain the fragmentation of jurisdiction which
presently exists in Australia in relation to family law and industrial law. In the area of
family law, a custody dispute between the parties to a marriage is a matter of Commonwealth law in relation to a natural child of the marriage but is likely to be a matter of
State law in relation to a step-child, although both children are part of the same household.” (citing R v Cook; ex parte C (1985) 156 CLR 249)).
116. See FEHLBERG & BEHRENS, supra note 48, at 26– 27; DICKEY, supra note 94, at 27.
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other. Considerably worse were circumstances under which families were
forced to litigate different portions of their dispute in different courts. This
was the case, for example, where a family sought parenting orders for multiple children, some of whom were the genetic or adopted offspring of both
members of the marital couple and some of whom were not.117 It was also
the case for many multi-faceted property disputes between separating
couples.118 It remains the case today for familial disputes that implicate
both private divorce law and public child protection law, and for many
parentage issues implicating adoption and assisted reproductive
technologies.119
1. Shared Court Jurisdiction
Australia attempted to address federal-state jurisdictional fragmentation and to coordinate the application of fragmented substantive law by
conferring shared jurisdiction on state and federal courts. Chapter III
(Australia’s equivalent of America’s Article III) confers on the Commonwealth Parliament the power to give state courts federal jurisdiction to
enforce federal law.120 As noted, this power was employed throughout the
nation during the period between the enactment of early national legislation covering marriage and divorce in 1959 and 1961 and the creation of
the Family Court of Australia in 1975,121 and it continues to be employed
in Western Australia today.122
Australia also attempted to consolidate state and federal matters,
including, but not limited to family law matters, in the federal courts. The
117. See FEHLBERG & BEHRENS, supra note 48, at 33.
118. See id. at 26– 27.
119. See id. at 86– 98, 289– 91; Fiona Kelly & Belinda Fehlberg, Australia’s Fragmented
Family Law System: Jurisdictional Overlap in the Area of Child Protection, 16 INT’L J. OF L.,
POL’Y, FAM. 38, 40 (2002). It is worth noting that state-federal divisions are not the only
source of court-to-court fragmentation. Within each of the American states, we see
some version of the Australian division between private domestic relations proceedings
and public abuse and neglect proceedings, as well as the problems that division creates.
Anne H. Geraghty & Wallace J. Mlyniec, Unified Family Courts: Tempering Enthusiasm
With Caution, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 435, 435– 36 (2002) (describing the unified family court
movement in the United States, which seeks to bring all matters touching family law
issues into one unified state court). Addressing this sort of fragmentation problem does
not implicate the constitutional constraints associated with federal-state power sharing,
but these examples of parallel intrastate fragmentation serve as a reminder that the
problem is not simply a federalism problem.
120. AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION ss 71, 77 (iii). Although Congress lacks this authority
to give state courts federal jurisdiction, American state courts have ample authority to
decide federal issues under their state jurisdiction. See Buss, supra note 105, at 734– 39.
Australian state courts (like American state courts) also have such authority to decide
federal law issues under a jurisdiction which “belongs to . . . the courts of the States,”
when federal jurisdiction is neither granted nor precluded. AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s
77(ii) & (iii); see also ZINES, supra note 105, at 235– 38.
121. See supra text accompanying note 105.
122. DICKEY, supra note 94, at 95– 96. The FLA offers this option, on the condition
that these state “family” courts are modeled after the Family Court of Australia, with
informality and procedures conducive to the solution of family controversies. Family
Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 41. Western Australia is the only state that chose this approach.
DICKEY, supra note 94, at 95– 96.
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most expansive version of this approach was pursued under the doctrine of
cross-vesting, which the High Court ultimately found to violate the Australian Constitution.123 After cross-vesting became unavailable, a federalism
principle that had always been available received more attention and, perhaps, more use in family law cases.124 Under accrued jurisdiction (“supplemental” or “pendent” jurisdiction in the United States), the
inseparability of state and federal issues justifies federal courts in exercising jurisdiction over state law issues closely aligned with matters that provide the basis for federal jurisdiction under section 75 or 76 of the
Australian Constitution. However, accrued jurisdiction includes only
some of what would have been brought within federal jurisdiction under
the cross-vesting legislation because it requires a relatively tight interconnection between the state and federal claims.125
2. Referrals from State to Federal Authority
There is little indication that the jurisdictional mechanisms discussed
in the previous section had more than a modest effect on the ability of
courts to consolidate adjudication of related family law matters. Moreover,
putting state family law and federal family law in the same courts did not
change the fact that there are two distinct bodies of substantive law to be
adjudicated as well as differences in the laws among the various states.
To reduce fragmentation in substantive family law and related jurisdictional authority, Australia invoked its “referral power” to expand the
federal Parliament’s authority to enact uniform federal law. This provision
adds to other Commonwealth powers under section 51 the power to make
laws with respect to:
matters referred to the Parliament of the Commonwealth by the Parliament
or Parliaments of any State or States, but so that the law shall extend only to
States by whose Parliaments the matter is referred, or which afterwards
adopt the law.126

To American eyes, this subsection is extraordinary.127 It provides the basis
123. See Re Wakim; ex parte McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511 (holding that federal jurisdiction was limited to “matters” specified in sections 75 and 76 of Chapter III of the
Australian Constitution); see also ZINES, supra note 105, at 154– 55.
124. See FEHLBERG & BEHRENS, supra note 48, at 71 (“Given the impact of Re Wakim in
narrowing the FCA’s jurisdiction, it was not surprising that soon after the HCA’s decision, positive views regarding the existence of the FCA’s accrued jurisdiction began to
surface in first-instance FCA decisions”); see Zines, supra note 105, at 140, 155.
125. See ZINES, supra note 105, at 137– 47 (explaining accrued jurisdiction); see also
id. at 148– 49 (explaining associated jurisdiction). The High Court found that this jurisdictional device gives the Family Court jurisdiction over some state law matters despite
its striking down of the cross-vesting provisions. See Re Wakim; ex parte McNally (1999)
198 CLR 511; see also ZINES, supra note 105, at 145.
126. AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s 51(xxxvii).
127. Cf. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 154 (1992) (“Where Congress
exceeds its authority relative to the States, . . . the departure from the constitutional plan
cannot be ratified by the ‘consent’ of state officials”). But see U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl.
3 (“No State shall, without the Consent of Congress . . . enter into any Agreement or
Compact with another state”); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 163 (White, J.,
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for unlimited expansion of federal power, subject to the states’ agreement.
Such a referral has the effect of adding the referred power to the Commonwealth Parliament’s legislative power just as if the Constitution itself contained the words of the referral as a subsection of section 51.128 As with
other parliamentary legislative powers under section 51, a state retains
concurrent power over a referred matter, but any inconsistent legislation
by a referring state would be invalid to the extent of the inconsistency.129
A referral is not something done lightly. Interstate and state-federal
distrust and the concern of state government officials that referrals would
be used to aggrandize the Commonwealth Parliament’s power at the
expense of the states long constrained the use of referrals.130 Expanding
federal power via referral is limited by the fact that only the referring state
can be subject to the resulting federal legislation, and when more than one
state refers, each is bound only to so much of the resulting federal legislation as conforms to that state’s referral. Complicated negotiations are
therefore likely required to bring all or most of the states into agreement,
and to ensure that the Commonwealth Parliament is receptive to the referral of power, as proposed by the states.131 This source of power is further
limited by states’ potential ability to revoke their referrals.132 For all these
dissenting). See also Cheryl Saunders, Cooperative Arrangements in Comparative Perspective, in THE FUTURE OF AUSTRALIAN FEDERALISM: COMPARATIVE AND INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 414, 428– 29 (Gabrielle Appleby et al. eds., 2012); Duncan B. Hollis,
Unpacking the Compact Clause, 88 TEXAS L. REV. 741, 741– 43 (2010).
128. For this reason, some Australian framers objected to the provision as an inappropriate circumvention of the demanding requirements for amending the Constitution.
See Deb. of the Australasian Fed. Convention, Melbourne, 27 Jan. 1898, 217– 18 (Dr.
John Quick) [hereinafter MELBOURNE CONVENTION DEBATES]; id. at 224 (Mr. Frederick
Holder); id. at 225 (Mr. Patrick Glynn).
129. AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s 109.
130. See Graeme A.R. Johnson, The Reference Power in the Australian Constitution, 9
Melb. U. L. Rev. 42, 42– 50 (1973); see also GEOFFREY SAWER, AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL POLITICS AND LAW: 1901– 1929 145 (1956).
131. See Justice R.S. French, The Referral of State Powers— Cooperative Federalism Lives,
31 U. W. AUSTL. L. REV. 19, 28 (2003) (describing the “convoluted negotiations and
game playing that went on prior to” the adoption of the Corporation Act based on the
Referral Power); Rosemary Owens, Unfinished Constitutional Business: Building a
National System to Regulate Work, 22 AUSTL. J. LAB. L. 258, 276– 82 (2009) (describing
the difficult process of negotiations for a national system of workplace regulation, with
resistance coming from New South Wales and, at least for the time being, culminating in
Western Australia’s bailing out when its Labor Government was voted out of office);
Ross Anderson, Reference of Powers by the States to the Commonwealth, 2 U. W. AUSTL.
ANN. REV. 1, 3 (1951); Johnson, supra note 130, at 46– 58.
132. State referrals are widely assumed to be revocable, although the issue is far from
settled. Compare Andrew Lynch, After a Referral: The Amendment and Termination of
Commonwealth Laws Relying on s 51 (xxxvii), 32 Sydney L. Rev. 363, 381– 84 (2010),
Johnson, supra note 130, at 69– 75, and “Senex,” Commonwealth Powers Bill— A Repletion
of opinions, 16 AUSTL. L. J. 323, 327 (1943), with French, supra note 131, at 33. According to Anne Twomey, the repeal of a referral on the basis of which Commonwealth legislation had been enacted would be invalid under section 109 of the Constitution; Lynch
has argued to the contrary that section 109 would not apply because the state’s decision
to revoke legislation and the Commonwealth’s referral-based legislation concern two
different subjects. Compare ANNE TWOMEY, THE CONSTITUTION OF NEW SOUTH WALES 810
(2014), with Lynch, supra, at 382. See also Cheryl Saunders, A New Direction for Intergov-
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reasons, the referral power was written off by one scholar only two decades
ago as a dead letter.133
Notwithstanding the significant encumbrances associated with this
mechanism as a means of expanding uniform national authority, the use of
referrals has, contrary to prediction, intensified in recent years;134 in family law alone, two major legislative enactments— concerning children and
de facto relationships— rest upon state referrals.135 The first of these
extended the scope of the federal parliament’s powers to include issues
related to “ex-nuptial” (non-marital in U.S. terms) children.136 This referral added an important missing piece to the federal government’s authority
to assign parental responsibility under the Family Law Act— an added
authority which the Commonwealth Parliament swiftly exercised.137 The
second major family law referral gave the Commonwealth Parliament
authority over the post-separation claims of de facto partners.138 The federal legislation authorized by this second referral has brought Australia up
to, but not through, the door of same-sex marriage recognition, a threshold
to which we return in Part III.
ernmental Agreements, 12 PUB. L. REV. 274, 282 (2001); W.A. WYNES, LEGISLATIVE, EXECUPOWERS IN AUSTRALIA 171– 72 (5th ed. 1976). It seems to be conceded,
however, that referrals may be for a fixed period or revocable on the basis of a specified
event. See R v Pub. Vehicles Licensing Appeal Tribunal [1964] 113 CLR 207, 226 (Austl.);
see also Lynch, supra, at 384 (noting that referrals are now habitually self-limiting). The
fate of Commonwealth legislation enacted on the basis of a withdrawn referral or on the
expiration of a self-limiting referral is still unsettled. See Lynch, supra, at 384– 85; TWOMEY, supra, at 811; “Senex,” supra, at 326; French, supra note 131, at 33. See also MELBOURNE CONVENTION DEBATES, supra 128, at 218 (Dr. John Quick) (asserting that if
revocation is possible, then confusion and uncertainty would result); id. at 218 (Mr.
Edmund Barton) (discussing when repeal by state is not available); id. at 219 (Mr. Josiah
Symon) (discussing if referral acted on resulting legislation, then it could not be interfered with by the state); id. at 220 (Mr. Isaac Isaacs) (agreeing with Mr. Symon); id. at
223 (Mr. George Reid) (agreeing with Mr. Symon and Mr. Isaac by implication); id. at
225 (Mr. Patrick Glynn) (discussing how state might, by referral, deprive itself of the
right of appeal).
133. Greg Craven, Death of a Placitum: the Fall and Fall of the Reference Power, 1 Pub.
L. Rev. 285, 286 (1990).
134. See Lynch, supra note 132, at 363, 366, 369. See, e.g., Corporations Act 2001
(Cth) s 4 (Austl.); Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) s 100.2, 100.3 (Austl.); Fair Work Act 2009
(Cth) s 30B, 30L (Austl.).
135. See FEHLBERG & BEHRENS, supra note 48, at 32– 35; DICKEY, supra note 94, at 3840; ALTOBELLI, FAMILY LAW IN AUSTRALIA: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 54-55 (2003); Dorothy
Kovacs, A Federal Law of De Facto Property Rights: the Dream and the Reality, 23 AUSTL. J.
FAM. L. 104, 114 (2009); Hon. J. Gary Watts, The De Facto Relationships Legislation, 23
AUSTL. J. FAM. L. 122, 122 (2009).
136. Significantly, the terms of the referring acts from the participating states (all
states other than Western Australia), are essentially the same. See, e.g., Commonwealth
Powers (Family Law-Children) Act 1986 (NSW) s 3 (Austl.).
137. Family Law Amendment Act 1987 (Cth) (Austl.).
138. See Commonwealth Family Law Amendment (De Facto Financial Matters and Other
Measures) Act 2008 (Cth) No. 115 sch 1 (Austl.). Again, the referring state laws (except
for Western Australia, which referred only superannuation matters) are in substantially
similar terms. See, e.g., Commonwealth Powers (De Facto Relationships) Act 2003 (NSW)
ss 1, 3. See also Jenni Millbank, The Changing Meaning of “De Facto” Relationships, 4
(Sydney Law Sch. Research Paper No. 06/43, 2006) (noting the change in the name from
“De Facto Relationships Act” to “Property (Relationships) Act”).
TIVE AND JUDICIAL
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Australia’s use of its referral power to consolidate its family law can
best be understood in connection with the jurisdictional developments discussed above, as, together, they tell a story of gradual, but still incomplete,
evolution toward the nationalization of the country’s family law. As noted,
when the FLA was first enacted, claims concerning children and property
that arose from the marriage were litigated in a different court than parallel
and interrelated claims that were not so tied to the marriage.139 A decade
later, states referred authority over parenting orders concerning ex-nuptial
children to the Commonwealth Parliament, which amended the FLA to
include resolution of all parenting claims, without regard to the parents’
marital status.140 This move toward national uniformity introduced a new
state-federal jurisdictional gap— this time between the claims of unmarried
couples regarding property distribution on the one hand and child custody
on the other; this gap was closed for the next ten years by the cross-vesting
provisions.141 The High Court’s rejection of cross-vesting in 1999 led to the
second wave of referrals, giving Parliament authority over the financial
claims between unmarried couples as well.142
In a sense, Australia’s evolution from state-based divorce law, to a partially nationalized divorce law, to court decisions circumscribing that
nationalization, to state referrals expanding the Commonwealth Parliament’s authority to nationalize, can be seen as paralleling the evolution of
divorce law in the United States from state-to-state free-for-all, to Courtimposed nationwide enforcement of out-of-state orders, to the Supreme
Court’s development of certain qualifications of that nationwide obligation, to the congressional expansion of those national obligations. The
important difference, of course, is that Australia’s tale is one of the gradual
nationalization of the substantive law, whereas in the United States the
story is of the gradually increasing national recognition of judgments
grounded on diverse state laws.143 In other words, in the context of
divorce, both countries developed a means of addressing the fragmentation
problems generated by their distinct family law federalism regimes in a
way that reinforced, rather than minimized, their distinctions.
However far from the framers’ thoughts family law may have been
when they adopted section 51 (xxxvii), the referral power has given Australians an ongoing opportunity to take up Sir Edmund Barton’s call at the
1897 constitutional convention for further deliberation concerning the
proper division of state and federal authority over family law.144 And, over
139. See supra notes 111– 18 and accompanying text.
140. Commonwealth Powers (Family Law) Act 1986 (SA) s 3 (Austl.); Family Law
Reform Act 1989 (Cth) No. 167 s 31 (Austl.).
141. FEHLBERG & BEHRENS, supra note 48, at 68.
142. Id. at 577– 79.
143. The result in the United States might be like what would have occurred in Australia had the framers adopted the Tasmanian compromise, giving the Commonwealth
Parliament the power to regulate “the status in other states of the Commonwealth of
persons married or divorced in any state.” See supra notes 23, 27– 30 and accompanying
text.
144. See supra notes 43 and accompanying text.
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time, the reach of national power over family law matters has expanded
beyond its original constitutional limits of marriage and divorce and
related parental rights.145 That being said, important portions of family
law (among them the regulation of child abuse and neglect) remain in state
control, and this state-federal fragmentation remains an ongoing topic of
concern for family law scholars and policy makers.146 While these concerns suggest that the Australian framers may not have gone far enough in
their commitment to family law uniformity, Australia’s current experience
with same-sex marriage reveals the potential problems that even partial
nationally imposed uniformity can create for family law innovation.
III. Putting the Two Federalist Designs to a Modern Test: Same-Sex
Marriage
Both countries applied and developed their family law federalism
regimes to address the specific issues raised by separating couples and, in
that context, both achieved considerable success in establishing a system of
stable, coherent, and predictable laws. Less certain, however, is how the
solutions developed in the context of divorce translate to other areas of
family law. In the United States, a primary question is whether the full
faith and credit obligation, which clearly applies to out-of-state judgments
(through which divorces are obtained), can and should apply to other legal
actions conferring family status, such as marriage; and a second, fastdeveloping question is whether and to what extent individual constitutional rights will nationalize family law and displace the full faith and
credit solution. In Australia, a primary question is the extent to which the
nationalization of conventional marriage and divorce law can and should
be extended to other aspects of family law. We turn to the respective development of same-sex marriage laws in both countries in order to expand
and update our comparative account of these two family law federalism
regimes.
At the time of Australia’s constitutional drafting, divorce was the family law issue of concern.147 There was a clear movement in the law of
divorce, and a range of strongly held views about whether that movement
should be encouraged, accepted, or resisted. Today, the central contested
issue in family law is same-sex marriage, and, in both the United States
and Australia, the law is in flux. As with divorce a century ago, there is a
145. This trend is in line with what many scholars perceive and sometimes decry as a
general trend toward the centralization of Australia’s federalism. See generally PAUL
KILDEA, ANDREW LYNCH, & GEORGE WILLIAMS, TOMORROW’S FEDERATION: REFORMING AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT (2012); Hon. Chief Justice Paul De Jersey, A Sketch of the Modern
Australian Federation, in THE FUTURE OF AUSTRALIAN FEDERALISM: COMPARATIVE AND INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES, supra note 127, at 66.
146. See, e.g., Belinda Fehlberg, Parenting Disputes, State Child Protection Laws and an
Attempt at Lateral Thinking, 25 AUSTRL. J. FAM. L. 157, 159– 160 (2011); see Daryl J.
Higgins and Rae Kaspiew, “Mind the Gap. . .”: Protecting children in family law cases, 22
AUSTL. J. OF FAM. L. 235, 242 (2008); see also FEHLBERG & BEHRENS, supra note 48, at
86– 89.
147. See supra notes 19– 33 and accompanying text.
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broad range of strongly held views about whether and to what extent recognition of same-sex marriage should be encouraged or resisted. And in both
countries, the important role played by their distinct family law federalism
regimes is a central focus of discussion.
A. Same-Sex Marriage in the United States
1. The Classical Model of State Autonomy and Experimentation
Until recently, the development of same-sex marriage in the United
States looked much like the development of divorce law that so scandalized
the Australian framers 100 years ago. It is a story of considerable experimentation and variety among the fifty states, variety not only in the states’
substantive laws, but also in the diverse legal paths taken to reach those
substantive ends.
At the turn of the twenty-first century, several state supreme courts
ruled that state laws limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples violated
non-discrimination and due process provisions of their state constitutions.148 Even among these rulings, there were significant differences in
fact finding, doctrinal analysis, and the relief awarded.149 In other states,
courts ruled that same-sex couples had no right to either marriage or a
148. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt.
1999); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health,
798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); Kerrigan v. Commissioner, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008);
In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862
(Iowa 2009).
149. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 68 (returning case to trial court to consider the possible justifications for a same-sex exclusion; finding that there is a fundamental right to marriage
which doesn’t extend to same-sex marriage under due process, but that strict scrutiny
applies because sex is a suspect category under Hawaii’s equal protection doctrine);
Baker, 744 A.2d at 886– 87 (ruling that any difference in treatment between opposite
and same-sex couples violated Vermont’s constitution, as the same-sex marriage ban
violated the state’s Common Benefits Clause because denying same-sex couples the benefits of marriage didn’t bear a reasonable and just relation to the government’s purpose,
but also finding that the status that conferred equal rights to same-sex couples did not
need to be called “marriage”); Lewis, 908 A.2d at 223– 24 (finding that there is a fundamental right to marriage that doesn’t include same-sex marriage under New Jersey’s due
process clause, but that under the state equal protection analysis denying same-sex
couples the benefits of marriage was unconstitutional because it bore no relationship to
a legitimate government interest, but also finding that the status that conferred equal
rights did not have to be called marriage); Goodridge, 798 N.E. 2d at 968 (finding that
Massachusetts’s same-sex marriage ban violated the Massachusetts constitution,
because under the state equal protection and due process analyses, the ban didn’t survive a rational basis test, so there was no need to determine if strict scrutiny applied);
Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 482 (finding that Connecticut’s ban violated the Connecticut constitution and that the ban was subject to intermediate scrutiny under the state’s equal
protection doctrine because gay persons were part of a quasi-suspect class); In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 453 (finding that California’s ban violated the California constitution because there is a fundamental right to marry that extends to all citizens under
due process, and that sexual orientation is a suspect class and thus strict scrutiny
applies under equal protection analysis); Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 907 (finding that
Iowa’s ban violated Iowa constitution after applying an intermediate level of scrutiny
based upon the finding that gay people were part of a quasi-suspect class).
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marriage-like status under their state constitutions.150
In response to this judicial activity, state legislatures got involved by
introducing both statutory and, in many cases, constitutional bans on
same-sex marriage.151 Among and in addition to these states were those
that enacted legislation creating a distinct legal status for same-sex
couples, entitling them to some or all of the benefits of marriage under
different names.152 These marriage-like provisions were favored by some
as a long-term alternative to same-sex marriage and by others as a step
along the way toward the full recognition of same-sex marriage as political
attitudes changed.153 In recent years, there has been a notable shift in
democratic support in favor of same-sex marriage, and all but two154 of the
twelve states that have recognized same-sex marriage pursuant to state law,
since 2009, have done so either through legislation or direct popular
vote.155
150. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 22 (N.Y. 2006) (the ban on samesex marriage did not violate state equal protection or due process rights); Andersen v.
King County, 138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006) (due process, the right to privacy, and equal
protection did not create a right to marry a person of the same-sex under the Washington constitution); Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571 (Md. 2007) (there is no fundamental
right to marry under the Maryland constitution, and the state had a legitimate interest in
banning same-sex marriage); Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995)
(same-sex marriage ban did not violate District’s law against discrimination based on
sex or sexual orientation, nor did it violate the U.S. Constitution); see also Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971) (the ban on same-sex marriage did not violate federal equal protection or due process rights).
151. Within twelve years of the Hawaii Supreme Court’s ruling, many states, including Hawaii, had added an express ban on same-sex marriage to their laws, and a majority of these prohibitions were ultimately adopted as constitutional amendments. See
Joanna L. Grossman, Resurrecting Comity: Revisiting the Problem of Non-Uniform Marriage Laws, 84 OR. L. REV. 433, 436 (2005)..
152. See, e.g., Cal. Fam. Code § 297– 297.5 (2012) (“domestic partnership”); 750 Ill.
Comp. Stat. Ann. 75/15 (2011) (since displaced by Illinois Same-Sex Marriage Act)
(“civil union”); N.J. Stat. Ann. Domestic Partnership Act. § 26:8a-1 (2004) (“domestic
partnership”); N.J. Stat. Ann. §37:1-28 (2007) (“civil union”); Wis. Stat. Ann. §770.05
(2009) (“domestic partnership”); Del. Code Ann. Eligibility to Enter into a Civil Union.
13, § 202 (2012) (“civil union”); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 122a.100 (2010) (“domestic
partnership”); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 106.305 (2008) (“domestic partnership”); Wash.
Rev. Code. Ann. § 26.60.030 (2007); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15-22-103 (2009) (“designated beneficiary agreements”); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14-15-103 (2013) (“civil
unions”); Haw. Rev. Stat. §572C-3 (1997) (“reciprocal beneficiary relationship”); Haw.
Rev. Stat. §572B-1 (2011) (“civil unions”); R.I. Gen. Laws. Ann. § 15-3.1-1 (2011) (“civil
unions”); D.C. Code § 32-702 (2012) (“domestic partnership”).
153. See generally Douglas NeJaime, Framing Inequality for Same-Sex Couples, 60
UCLA L. Rev. Disc. 184 (2013) (discussing the difference between two views of civil
unions— that civil unions represent an alternative to marriage that provided equality to
same-sex couples, and that civil unions were just a step on the way towards equality);
Elizabeth Glazer, Civil Union Equality, 2012 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 125 (2012)
(same).
154. See Garden State Equal. v. Dow, 82 A.3d 336, 368– 69 (N.J. 2013) (finding that
New Jersey’s civil union law violated same-sex couples’ equal protection rights); Griego
v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865, 889 (N.M. 2013) (finding that New Mexico’s ban on same-sex
marriage violated the New Mexico state constitution).
155. Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island,
(also Washington D.C.) (by legislation), and Maine, Maryland, and Washington (by
popular vote), 33 States with Legal Gay Marriage and 17 States with Same-Sex Marriage
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Additional complexity in state laws’ treatment of same-sex couples
was introduced through state law and practice concerning same-sex parenting. For the most part, medical clinics providing assisted reproductive
technologies were open to same-sex couples, and issues of parentage were
only pressed when these couples separated, again, to different ends in different states. In at least one state, the marriage and parentage laws ran in
opposite directions: in 2001, Pennsylvania prohibited same-sex marriage,
while leading the way in recognizing the parental claim of a non-biologically related same-sex partner.156 Moreover, much decision making about
placement and family formation, particularly for children who are placed
in the child welfare system due to allegations of abuse and neglect, is heavily driven by the individual best interest judgments of social workers and
judges.157 This allowed courts, in effect, to form same-sex couple families
(through the authorization of foster care placements with or adoptions by
same-sex couples) in some states even as those states refused to recognize
same-sex marriages.158 Conversely, intense opposition to same-sex marriage inspired some legislatures to press for restrictions on same-sex
couples’ access to adoption and assisted reproductive technologies, restrictions that were never contemplated before.159
From the perspective of the nineteenth century Australian framers,
this tale could readily be seen as a scandalous free-for all. For the champions of the United States’ fifty-state social and legal laboratories of experimentation, this tremendous proliferation of diverse approaches might be
taken as a sign of federalistic health. Not only was the issue engaged by
courts, legislatures, and the national public, but that engagement took
states in any number of directions, based on any number of reasons that
were fleshed out with some care in briefs, court opinions, testimony at
legislative hearings, and popular media. Even the division of states into
supporters and opponents doesn’t quite capture these developments, as
some states that banned same-sex marriage also instituted domestic partBans, PROCON.ORG (Nov. 13, 2014), http://gaymarriage.procon.org/view.resource.php?
resourceID=004857.
156. See T.B. v. L.R.M., 786 A.2d 913, 920 (Pa. 2001) (“[Non-biologically related
same-sex-partner of biological mother] stood in loco parentis to the child and therefore
had standing to seek partial custody for purposes of visitation”).
157. See Nancy D. Polikoff, Recognizing Partners but Not Parents/Recognizing Parents
but Not Partners: Gay and Lesbian Family Law in Europe and the United States, 17 N.Y.L.
SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 711, 714– 15 (noting demand for adoptive families in the United States
and the support of “mainstream child welfare organizations” for gay and lesbian
adoptions).
158. See Vanessa A. Lavely, The Path to Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage: Reconciling
the Inconsistencies Between Marriage and Adoption Cases, 55 UCLA L. Rev. 247 (2007);
Polikoff, supra note 157, at 748– 49 (describing Connecticut’s decision to allow same-sex
couples to adopt children while expressly limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples).
That being said, there is no question that the proliferation of same-sex parenting couples
added weight to the arguments in favor of giving legal recognition to the couples’ relationships. See id. at 746– 47.
159. See Polikoff, supra note 157, at 750 (noting that Mississippi enacted a law
prohibiting same-sex couple adoptions out of concern that such adoptions might lead to
a court decision mandating the recognition of same-sex marriage).
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nership provisions or created the institution of civil union to give same-sex
couples equal rights in all but name. The Wikipedia site on “Same-sex
Marriage in the United States” captured this evolving diversity with an everchanging map of the fifty states coded in shades of blue (recognition laws),
and red (prohibition laws) and stripes (various combinations of the
two).160
This fifty-state variety also produced precisely the sort of second-order
problems that the Australian framers had abhorred in the context of
divorce. With respect to the recognition of same-sex marriage, there has
been a considerable amount of interstate confusion and inconsistency,
with hazardous consequences for members of same-sex couples and their
children. Where states opposed to same-sex marriage refused to recognize
out-of-state same-sex marriages, they not only denied marital benefits during the life of the marriage, but also denied access to divorce should the
couple choose to end the marriage.161 Even more troubling, a state that
did not recognize same-sex marriage could refuse to recognize a parentchild relationship, for purposes of assigning custodial rights and responsibilities, to a same-sex partner who lacked a biological relationship with the
child.162
Had courts applied the lessons learned in the divorce context to
resolve issues raised by the interstate diversity in same-sex marriage laws,
they would have found states obligated to give full force to out-of-state marriages that were non-evasively obtained. But courts did not adopt this
approach, and while some states recognized out-of-state same-sex marriages even when they did not themselves license same-sex marriages,163
no court found that a state had an obligation to do so, under the Full Faith
160. Same-Sex Marriage in the United States, WIKIPEDIA, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/samesex_marriage_in_the_United_States (last visited Feb. 10, 2015). This map has been continually changing, and now reflects (with some added colors) federal court developments as well.
161. See Nick Tarasen, Untangling the Knot: Finding a Forum for Same-Sex Divorces in
the State of Celebration, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1585, 1592– 94 (2011).
162. This problem played out dramatically, though in the context of a civil union and
not a same-sex marriage, in Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins. In that case, a Virginia court
refused to recognize the same-sex partner of the biological mother of a child as a parent
with custody or visitation rights, despite the fact that they had been joined in civil union
in Vermont. A jurisdictional battle involving the Vermont and Virginia courts ensued
and was only ultimately resolved (in favor of the non-biological partner) on the basis of
a technical ruling with no precedential value. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d
951 (Vt. 2006), 637 S.E.2d 330 (Va. Ct. App. 2006), 661 S.E.2d 822 (Va. 2008), 678
S.E.2d 268 (Va. Ct. App. 2009) 12 A.3d 768 (Vt. 2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S.
1026(2010). In another case, a state refused to recognize both members of a same-sex
married couple as parents, despite the fact that they had both legally adopted the child
in another state. Adar v. Smith, 639 F.3d 146 (5th Cir. 2011); but see Finstuen v.
Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2007) (Oklahoma statute preventing recognition of
adoptions by same-sex couples violated Full Faith and Credit Clause). See generally
Joseph A. Fraioli, Having Faith in Full Faith & Credit: Finstuen, Adar and the Quest for
Interstate Same-Sex Parental Recognition, 98 Iowa L. Rev. 365 (2012).
163. See, e.g., Martinez v. County of Monroe, 850 N.Y.S.2d 740 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008);
Port v. Cowan, 44 A.3d 970 (Md. 2012).
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and Credit Clause.164 This meant that even couples who were legally married in one state could not be confident that the important benefits and
protections associated with that status would survive the movement of
either one of them out of state. The ongoing instability of these relationships may have encouraged couples to shift their attention to federal litigation where they asserted that same-sex marriage bans violated their civil
rights under the United States Constitution. After considering the full faith
and credit road not traveled, we will turn to federal developments that are
rapidly displacing the fifty-state laboratory.
2. Applying the Federalism Lessons from Divorce to Marriage
The American solution to the problem created by interstate diversity in
divorce law was to impose an obligation on all states to recognize a divorce
validly obtained in any other state, without regard to the forum state’s
divorce policy.165 This solution was achieved through the development of
a constitutional obligation under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. The
straightforward solution to the current issue of interstate recognition of
same-sex marriages is to apply the lessons learned in the context of divorce
and to impose the same constitutional obligation on forum states to recognize validly obtained same-sex marriages. To date, however, courts have
found no such constitutional obligation in the context of marriage, and the
bulk of scholarly opinion dismisses the appropriateness of applying the
Full Faith and Credit Clause to compel out-of-state marriage recognition,
reasoning that marriage is not, like divorce, obtained through a judicial
proceeding, the form of out-of-state legal action that has been most clearly
and strongly protected in the cases.166 After a brief review of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause’s application to other state legal actions, we argue that
the best understanding of the Clause, its purpose, and the important role it
played in resolving the parallel problem in the divorce context all call for its
similar application to marriage.
The Full Faith and Credit Clause requires states to give full faith and
credit to out-of-state “public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings.”167
The Clause’s strong protection of “judicial proceedings”168 has been rou164. See generally Steve Sanders, Is the Full Faith and Credit Clause Still “Irrelevant” to
Same-Sex Marriage?: Toward a Reconsideration of the Conventional Wisdom, 89 IND. L.J.
95 (2014); ANDREW KOPPELMAN, SAME SEX, DIFFERENT STATES: WHEN SAME-SEX MARRIAGES
CROSS STATE LINES 118 (2006). As we discuss, below, several federal courts have recently
found that states are required, under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of
the U.S. Constitution, to recognize same-sex marriages validly celebrated in a sister
state. See infra Part III.A.3.a.vi.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 66– 93.
166. KOPPELMAN, supra note 164, at 118; Patrick J. Borchers, The Essential Irrelevance
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV.
353, 358 (2005); Ralph U. Whitten, Full Faith and Credit for Dummies, 28 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 465 (2005); but see Sanders supra note 164, at 96.
167. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
168. Australia, like the United States, gives binding effect to out-of-state judgments.
Brian R. Opeskin, Constitutional Dimensions of Choice of Law in Australia, 3 Pub. L. Rev.
152, 173 n. 79 (1992).
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tinely distinguished from the weak obligation imposed by the Clause on a
forum state to apply the substantive law, or “public Acts,” of a sister
state,169 and the reasons for this distinction are straightforward. The first
reason is textual, and focuses on the implementing statute, as enacted and
amended around the time of the Clause’s adoption.170 In both versions of
the statute, “acts of the legislatures of the several states” were included in
the description of methods of authentication of another state’s law, but
not, as judgments (and records) were, also included in the provision requiring that they be given the same effect in “every court within the United
States” as they were given in the state where they were issued.171 The second justification for the distinct treatment of judgments and substantive
law is functional. Requiring states to give full faith and credit to sister state
judgments imposes concrete, well-defined obligations on a forum state otherwise left free to govern its residents, whereas requiring a forum state to
give full faith and credit to sister states’ substantive law could impose a
broad and ill-defined obligation that goes to the heart of the forum state’s
sovereignty.172
The third justification goes to the underlying purpose of the Clause—
to help bring the states together in one nation.173 Just as finality and clar169. See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 494 (2003); Baker v. General
Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 232 (1998) (distinguishing between “credit owed to [legislative measures and common law] and to judgments”). See also Borchers, supra note 166,
at 358 (referring to the “two” branches of Supreme Court jurisprudence).
170. This implementing statute was originally enacted in 1790, and then amended in
1804. Cf. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 351– 52 (1816) (emphasizing the relevance of, for purposes of constitutional interpretation, action taken contemporaneously with the writing of the Constitution and noting that the first Congress was
composed of men who were involved in the framing of and deliberations over the
Constitution).
171. Omitting the inclusion of “public Acts,” the critical language in the original statute said, “[a]nd the said records and judicial proceedings authenticated as aforesaid,
shall have such faith and credit given to them in every court within the United States, as
they have by law or usage in the courts of the state from whence the said records are or
shall be taken.” Act of 26 May 1790, ch. XI, 1 Stat. 122 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1738 (2014)) (authentication of the acts and judicial proceedings of the states);
Act of 27 Mar. 1804, ch. LVI, 2 Stat. 298 (supplemented Act of 26 May 1790).
172. Douglas Laycock captured the dilemma that makes a duty to adopt a sister
state’s “public Acts” a very different proposition from giving a sister state’s judgment the
same recognition that it would be given in the sister state itself: “To simultaneously
apply the conflicting law of two states is impossible; to require each state to apply the
law of the other is absurd; and to let each state apply its own law repeals the [Full Faith
and Credit] Clause.” Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The
Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 297 (1992). Accord
Nadelmann, supra note 70, at 73.; Patrick J. Borchers, Baker v. General Motors: Implications for Interjurisdictional Recognition of Non-Traditional Marriages, 32 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 147, 159 (1998); Justice W.M.C. Gummow, Full Faith and Credit in Three Federations, 46 S.C. L. REV. 979, 986– 87 (1995) (making the same point about absurdity with
respect to Australia’s nearly equivalent Full Faith and Credit Clause).
173. See, e.g., Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 545– 46 (1948) (“The Full Faith and Credit
Clause . . . substituted a command for the earlier principles of comity and thus basically
altered the status of the States as independent sovereigns”); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v.
Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 439 (1943) (“The full faith and credit clause like the commerce
clause thus became a nationally unifying force. It altered the status of the several states
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ity of rights and obligations, achieved through the announcement and
enforcement of judgments in individual cases, allow citizens within a state
to order their affairs and develop relationships in reliance on those rights
and obligations, finality and clarity of rights and obligations across state
lines similarly allow a highly mobile nation of citizens to order their affairs
and develop relations in reliance on rights and obligations that will not
change as they cross state lines. And while predictability and clarity are
needed in the application of substantive law, that predictability and clarity
can generally be achieved, at least as successfully, by allowing each state to
apply its own laws to those within its borders. All this being said, the
Supreme Court has concluded that even public Acts are entitled to full faith
and credit in some circumstances,174 but increasingly the Clause has been
interpreted to impose only modest limits on a state’s ability to apply its
own substantive law.175
as independent foreign sovereignties, each free to ignore rights and obligations created
under the laws or established by the judicial proceedings of the others, by making each
an integral part of a single nation, in which rights judicially established in any part are
given nation-wide application.”); David P. Currie, Full Faith and Credit to Marriages, 1
GREEN BAG 2d 7, 12 (1997) (“The Full Faith and Credit Clause is designed to promote
interstate harmony”); Emily J. Sack, Domestic Violence Across State Lines: The Full Faith
and Credit Clause, Congressional Power, and Interstate Enforcement of Protection Orders,
16 NW. U. L. REV. 827, 851 (2004); Justice Robert Jackson, Full Faith and Credit— The
Lawyer’s Clause of the Constitution, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 17 (“[The Full Faith and Credit
Clause] was placed foremost among those measures which would guard the new political and economic union against the disintegrating influence of provincialism in jurisprudence, but without aggrandizement of federal power at the expense of the states”).
174. See, e.g., Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 613– 14 (1951) (finding that Wisconsin
was required by the Full Faith and Credit Clause to recognize Illinois’ wrongful death
statute as a “public Act” of a sister state). In contrast, the Australian High Court has
found a total absence of any constitutional full faith and credit obligation with respect to
“public Acts” under the Australian Constitution. See Breavington v Godleman [1988]
HCA 40, ¶ 43; Brian Opeskin, Constitutional Dimensions of Choice of Law in Australia, 3
PUB. L. REV. 152, 173– 80 (1992); Geoffrey Lindell and Sir Anthony Mason, The Resolution of Inconsistent State and Territory Legislation, 38 FED. L. REV. 391, 416 (2010) (discussing how Australian Constitution section 118 has a “minor” effect on common law
choice of law in precluding reliance on a public policy exception).
175. The Supreme Court has developed the doctrine to allow a forum state to apply
its own substantive law so long as it has a minimal legitimate connection to the individuals and circumstances addressed in the litigation. Alaska Packers Ass’n v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 294 U.S. 532, 547– 48 (1935) (holding that one who challenges, under
the Full Faith and Creidt Clause, the right of a forum state to enforce its own statutes
“assumes the burden of showing . . . that of the conflicting interests involved, those of
the foreign state are superior to those of the forum” state); Pacific Employer Insurance
Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493, 501 (1939) (“[T]he very nature of the
federal union of states . . . precludes resort to the full faith and credit clause as the
means for compelling a state to substitute the statutes of other states for its own statutes
dealing with a subject matter concerning which it is competent to legislate”); Allstate
Insurance Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312– 13 (1982) (holding that forum state is not
prevented by Full Faith and Credit or Due Process Clauses from applying its own law
where it has sufficient contacts creating state interests to make the application of its law
neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair); Sun Oil v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 729– 30
(1988) (holding that where state applies traditional choice of law rules that would have
been accepted at the time when the Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Clauses were
ratified, application of forum law is valid even if it fails the Allstate test); Franchise Tax
Bd. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 496 (2003).
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While the justifications for distinguishing a sister state’s judgments,
which states are required under the Full Faith and Credit Clause to enforce,
and a sister state’s substantive law, which states are generally not required
to apply, are compelling, a complicating connection exists between the
two: if citizens had complete freedom to travel to other states to obtain
rights and obligations that they could then return home to enforce, citizens
would essentially have the ability (so long as they had the means to travel)
to import whatever law they wished, however contrary that law was to the
public policy of their state of residence.
As we have seen in the divorce context, the Supreme Court has interpreted the full faith and credit obligation to stop short of requiring states to
enforce such evasively acquired judgments.176 In these proceedings, jurisdiction is tied to domicile, a relationship between state and citizen that
requires a physical presence and an intent to remain.177 The jurisdictional
qualification of the full faith and credit obligation places some limit, if at
times a fairly thin one, on citizens’ ability to travel to another state for the
sole purpose of importing the benefit of that state’s law back to the citizen’s home state.178
How much the full faith and credit obligation extends to other state
actions affecting the familial status of American citizens depends largely
upon how another state’s legal actions are categorized. The highly protected “judicial Proceedings” include, in addition to divorce, judgments
concerning custody, child support,179 parentage, and adoption.180 At the
other extreme, the largely unprotected category of “public Acts” includes
the statutes and common law that set out the substantive law of a state,
such as the recognized grounds for divorce, the period of residence
required for divorce, and the qualifications for marriages occurring within
the state.181 But the state’s celebration of a marriage is neither a judicial
proceeding nor, as the term is used in the Clause, a public Act182 (despite
176. See III.A.1. (discussing Williams v. North Carolina (Williams II), 325 U.S. 226,
236 (1945)).
177. Id. at 236 (“‘Domicil[e],’ the jury was instructed, was that place where a person
‘has voluntarily fixed his abode . . . not for a mere special or temporary purpose, but
with a present intention of making it his home, either permanently or for an indefinite
or unlimited length of time’”).
178. See James Weinstein, The Federal Common Law Origins of Judicial Jurisdiction:
Implications for Modern Doctrine, 90 VA. L. REV. 169, 193 (2004).
179. Note, however, that the extent of states’ obligation to enforce sister states’ child
custody and child support rulings was clarified through federal legislation after court
decisions interpreted the constitutional obligation more narrowly. See supra notes
82– 90 and accompanying text.
180. See also JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, INTERSTATE RELATIONS: THE NEGLECTED DIMENSION
OF FEDERALISM 64– 69 (1996). There is some controversy in the adoption context. See
supra note 162 and accompanying text. See Fraioli, supra note 162; Rhonda Wasserman,
Are You Still My Mother?: Interstate Recognition of Adoptions by Gays and Lesbians, 58 AM.
U. L. REV. 1,8 (2009) (discussing the arguments against adoption as a “judicial proceeding” subject to the Full Faith and Credit Clause).
181. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 180, at 59.
182. See Brian H. Bix, State Interests in Marriage, Interstate Recognition, and Choice of
Law, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 337, 344 (2005); Emily J. Sack, The Retreat from DOMA: The
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scholarly argument to the contrary).183 Rather, it is best placed in the category of a “Record,” the third category of legal actions listed in the
Clause.184
“Records” are by far the least developed category of state legal actions
addressed in full faith and credit jurisprudence.185 Deeds, mortgages and
wills fall into this category,186 and, in the context of family law, birth,
death, and marriage certificates seem to fall into this category as well.187
The three reasons to distinguish judicial proceedings from public acts, discussed above, all suggest that records— at least records that document a
state’s completed conferral of a familial status— have more in common with
judicial Proceedings than with public Acts and therefore should be entitled
to strong protection under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
First, as a textual matter, the same original implementing statute, reinforced shortly thereafter in a clarifying amendment, included records,
along with judicial proceedings but not public acts, among those matters to
be given “such faith and credit . . . as they have by the law or usage in the
Courts of the state from whence the said records are or shall be taken.”188
By the original reasoning of the Supreme Court in Mills v. Duryee, this
language suggests that all public office records, like judicial records, are to
be given the same effect by the forum state as they would be given in the
state where they were entered, rather than merely accepted by the forum
state as evidence.189
Second, functional considerations support treating records like judicial proceedings, rather than like public acts under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause. Requiring a forum state to recognize and give effect to sister
state records, such as certificates that document the conferral of a legal
status, does not conjure up the absurdity suggested by a requirement that
Public Policy of Same-Sex Marriage and a Theory of Congressional Power under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 507, 524 (2005).
183. See, e.g.,Whitten, supra note 70, at 389– 90.
184. Shawn Gebhardt, Comment, Full Faith and Credit for Status Records: A Reconsideration of Gardiner, 97 CAL. L. REV. 1419, 1421 (2009).
185. Id. at 1444.
186. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 180, at 59.
187. Gebhardt, supra note 184 at 1444.
188. Act of 26 May 1790, ch. XI, 1 Stat. 122 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1738
(2014)) (authentication of the acts and judicial proceedings of the states); Act of 27 Mar.
1804, ch. LVI, 2 Stat. 298 (supplemented Act of 26 May 1790). While there may have
been some ambiguity in the original statute about whether this language extended
beyond records of judicial proceedings, this ambiguity was eliminated when the statute
was amended in 1804 to include “records and exemplifications of office books kept in
any public office of any state.” Nadelmann, supra note 70, at 61; Act of 27 Mar. 1804, ch.
LVI, 2 Stat. 298. See also 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 554 (1803) (explaining that the amendment applied to records “in any public office of a state not appertaining to a court”).
189. Nadelmann, supra note 70, at 61– 62. In response to a question raised in the
House of Representatives on November 1, 1803— ”whether any additional provisions are
necessary to be made” to the original enforcement act of 1790— Congress enacted the
Act of 27 Mar. 1804. As Professor Nadelmann explained, one of the two important
things this amendment accomplished was the extension “to records and exemplifications
of office books kept in any public office of any state, not appertaining to a court.” Id. at
61.
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forum states routinely apply one another’s substantive law. Just as with
judgments, forum states could give effect to these specific instances of outof-state legal action without embracing the substantive law on which they
are based.190
Third is the justification tied to purpose. Just as with judgments,
records that establish a legal status change the rights and obligations of
individuals in a concrete and clearly defined way. Individuals rely on such
express and enforceable assignments of rights and responsibilities in ordering their affairs, and the aim of the Full Faith and Credit Clause was to
expand the reach of that legal stability across an entire nation. And, as
with judgments, the importance of defining and stabilizing rights and obligations across state lines is particularly important where those rights and
obligations apply to a relationship between two people and related children, rather than to a single individual.191
All of this suggests that a marriage certificate— the official state record
of a marriage celebrated in that state— should be understood in much the
same way as a divorce decree, for purposes of applying the Full Faith and
Credit Clause. While a divorce decree is a record of a court judgment and
a marriage certificate is a record of another official state act, both document legal acts that establish familial status, with important implications
for the couple and third parties that necessarily transcend state borders. In
addition, both are issued pursuant to established procedures designed to
ensure the reliability of the legal information reported and the validity of
the familial status obtained. If anything, the claim for out-of-state marriage
recognition is stronger than for the recognition of out-of-state divorce, for
in the marriage context the couple is, by definition, united in their interest
in having the important family status recognized.192 With divorce, in contrast, as Williams v. North Carolina well illustrated, the parties are often at
odds about whether the status is something to be embraced or challenged.
190. See Gebhardt, supra note 184, at 1442– 44.
191. Id. at 1447– 50. One other assumption made in the typical argument for excluding marriage recognition from states’ full faith and credit obligation is worth countering,
both to reveal a point of confusion and to note the diversity of documents within the
“Records” category. Scholars who dismiss the full faith and credit argument often
assume that the relevant legal document in question is the marriage “license,” that is, the
document authorizing the marriage, rather than the certificate, the document officially
recording when a marriage has occurred. See, e.g., Borchers, supra note 166, at 358;
KOPPELMAN, supra note 164, at 118. In authorizing a marriage, a license essentially
declares that a couple meets the state’s requirements to marry in that state; this is
clearly a declaration of qualifications that cannot be transported across state lines. In
contrast, marriage certificates are the official recording of the status of a marriage conferred; this intention, of course, is for that legal status to be permanent and without
territorial borders. Indeed, the permanency of the status is understood to be an important aspect of what it means to be married, and the status creates not only rights, but
also responsibilities that spouses cannot avoid until their status is officially altered
through divorce.
192. This argument is compatible with the approach taken in Sherrer v. Sherrer, in
which the Court refused to apply Williams II’s jurisdictional qualification to a state’s full
faith and credit obligation where the divorce-opposing spouse had participated in the
divorce-granting proceeding. 334 U.S. 343, 349 (1948).

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\48-1\CIN103.txt

142

unknown

Seq: 38

1-JUL-15

Cornell International Law Journal

14:20

Vol. 48

If marriage certificates received the same full faith and credit treatment as divorce decrees, every state would be free to apply its own conditions for granting such a certificate but, like a divorce decree, any marriage
certificate granted pursuant to those conditions would be required to be
given the same recognition in every other state. A forum state could not
withhold recognition of the marriage simply because of its moral disapproval of the marriage. That is the significance of Williams I, in which the
Supreme Court required North Carolina to recognize a divorce issued in
Nevada that was granted on terms inconsistent with North Carolina’s public policy.193 However, as with divorce, an exception could be made to a
forum state’s obligation to recognize the validity of a sister state’s marriage
if that marriage was obtained by forum state residents in an attempt to
evade the requirements of the forum state’s law. That is the significance of
Williams II.194
States have not, however, found themselves obligated by the Full Faith
and Credit Clause to recognize same-sex marriages that were validly and
non-evasively celebrated in another state.195 Absent a constitutional
requirement, states apply the common law principle of “comity.” And
while the rule of “lex loci celebrationis,” (the law of the place of celebration) directs that a marriage valid where celebrated is to be recognized as
valid everywhere,196 states have qualified that obligation to recognize outof-state marriages under a public policy exception.197 Of course, it is pre193. Williams I, 317 U.S. at 303.
194. Williams II, 325 U.S. at 236. A parallel exception for evasive marriages has also
been developed under state conflict of laws doctrine, see infra note 197.
195. See supra notes 163– 64 and accompanying text.
196. See, e.g., PETER HAY ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 621 (5th ed. 2010); EUGENE F.
SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 548 (3d ed. 2000); HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF
DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 98 (2d ed. 1987).
197. HAY, ET AL., supra note 196, at 621– 22. Although the focus of the public policy
exception is on the substantive distinctions between the marriage laws of the two states
in question, the application of the rule has frequently drawn a distinction between cases
where parties travel to another state temporarily for the purpose of gaining the benefit of
a sister state’s favorable marriage laws and cases where parties are lawfully married in
one state and later choose to move to (or travel through) a state in which the marriage
could not have been celebrated. Courts and legislatures routinely relieve the home state
of any obligation to enforce the evasive marriages that go against the home state’s public
policy, but require the home state to recognize marriages that violate the same public
policy if they were celebrated legally in the couples’ state of residence. This is the rule set
out in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, which provides:
A marriage which satisfies the requirements of the state where the marriage was
contracted will everywhere be recognized as valid unless it violates the strong
public policy of another state which had the most significant relationship to the
spouses and the marriage at the time of the marriage.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS: STATUS § 283 (1971).
Especially notable, some courts applied this rule in states that banned interracial marriage (before such bans were found unconstitutional in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967)), when confronted with mixed race couples who had married lawfully in another
state. Declaring that “the law of nations is a part of the law of North Carolina,” a state
judge in North Carolina recognized a couple’s valid South Carolina marriage, despite the
court’s view that such marriages were “revolting to us.” State v. Ross, 76 N.C. 242,
246– 47 (1877). In contrast, southern courts consistently invalidated marriages
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cisely such policy driven exceptions that the evolution of the full faith and
credit obligation was designed, in the divorce context, to eliminate.198
For decades, the states’ general policy of favoring marriage and the
minimal differences among states’ marriage laws199 limited application of
the public policy exception and the related development of the law. With
the introduction of same-sex marriage in a number of American states,
however, the scope and legitimacy of this exception moved to center stage.
3. Challenges to America’s Family Law Federalism Regime
Rather than responding to the proliferation of diverse state approaches
to same-sex marriage by imposing an obligation of interstate recognition,
the federal government enacted legislation— the Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA)— to discourage that coordination.200 This legislative resistance to
states’ full faith and credit obligation reflects, in our view, a failure to learn
from the lessons of the past that threatens to leave United States family law
in an unstable state. After considering DOMA’s constitutionality under the
Full Faith and Credit Clause, we will turn to the federal civil rights litigation sparked by DOMA, litigation that will likely bring stability to the law
of marriage, while profoundly altering the United States’ family law federalism design.
a. The Defense of Marriage Act
In 1996, in response to the Hawaii Supreme Court’s ground-breaking
opinion calling into question the legality of the state’s same-sex marriage
ban under the Hawaii Constitution, Congress enacted DOMA in an attempt
to restrict the reach and influence of any state’s recognition of same-sex
marriage. As enacted, DOMA had two substantive provisions. In Section
2, the Act provided that:
No State . . . shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or
judicial proceeding of any other State . . . respecting a relationship between
persons of the same-sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such
other State. . . or a right or claim arising from such relationshipFalse
obtained by those seeking to avoid the miscegenation ban in their home state. See,
KOPPELMAN, supra note 164, at 30– 32. Thus, application of the public policy exception
has commonly, but not universally, been limited to circumstances in which the marriage
is both against the state’s public policy and obtained by evasion.
198. See Williams II, 325 U.S. at 228 (reasoning that imposing a constitutional full
faith and credit obligation was required because “comity may be ‘too fluid [and] illdefined’ a concept for domestic relations purposes insofar as the marital status conferred by another state is at issue”).
199. See Sanders, supra note 164, at 110 (“[U]p until now, there has been little need
to enforce” a federal full faith and credit obligation because states have been generous in
applying each other’s law and “recognize[ ] the desirability of uniform marital status”).
Differences in laws concerning miscegenation were eliminated decades ago. No state
allows polygamy, nor marriage between parent and child or brother and sister. For
some time, the most significant distinctions among state marriage requirements concerned minimum age and marriages between first cousins. MARK STRASSER, SAME-SEX
UNIONS ACROSS THE UNITED STATES 45– 49 (2011); KOPPELMAN, supra note 164, at 30– 32.
200. See STRASSER, supra note 199, at 61.
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The Act further provided in Section 3 that:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of
the United States, the word “marriage,” means only a legal union between
one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word “spouse” refers
only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.201

The Act was not invoked for several years until Massachusetts became the
first state to find that its constitution compelled the legalization of samesex marriage.202 Since that time, the constitutional challenges to DOMA
have centered on equal protection and due process arguments, and largely
ignored potential challenges based on the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
The Supreme Court ultimately struck down Section 3 in Windsor v. United
States203 and Windsor, in turn, was relied upon by federal district courts to
invalidate state non-recognition laws on equal protection and due process
grounds. Before turning to these significant developments, we consider the
validity of Section 2 under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, which has
implications for all potentially controversial familial statuses conferred by
state law.
i. Federalism Constraints on DOMA Section 2
Under Section 2, states are freed from any obligation to recognize
same-sex marriages celebrated in other states. This means that lawfully
married couples could put all their rights and obligations associated with
the marriage at risk when they cross state lines, and one spouse could
exploit that vulnerability to escape marital and related parental obligations. Section 2 has been subject to very little litigation under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause,204 and there has been no authoritative assessment
of the section’s constitutionality. We argue that, in keeping with the
United States’ family law federalism regime, Section 2 should be found
unconstitutional under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
DOMA’s Section 2 is an express authorization to override any full faith
and credit obligation with respect to same-sex marriages. It thus raises
questions about the scope of both the constitutional obligation imposed by
the Clause and Congress’s power to define and modify that obligation pursuant to its implementing authority. On the first question, as noted, many
scholars have argued that the constitutional full faith and credit obligation
does not even apply because these protections are limited to judgments,
and marriages, unlike divorces, are not given effect through judgments.205
If this argument is correct, then Section 2 is unnecessary, though perhaps
201. Id.
202. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003).
203. U.S. v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
204. Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1303 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (holding that Congress had authority, under the Full Faith and Credit Clause’s implementing statute, to
enact Section 2).
205. See, e.g., Ralph U.Whitten, supra note 166, at 479– 83; KOPPELMAN, supra note
164, at 118.
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not entirely constitutional, as it sweeps in “judicial Proceedings” among
the sister states’ legal actions relating to same-sex marriage that a forum
state is authorized to ignore. As already noted, however, we think the language, function and purpose of the Clause, and the inclusion of “Records”
as distinct from “judicial Proceedings” and “public Acts,” all counsel in
favor of the Clause’s application to marriage.
Further complicating the analysis is the second sentence of the Clause,
in which Congress is given the power to make laws prescribing the “manner” and “effect” of the “Acts, Records, and Proceedings” that are the subject of the Clause.206 In many cases, the Court’s analysis of the full faith
and credit obligation has merged the obligations imposed by the Constitution with those imposed by Congress’s implementing statute.207 Perhaps
Congress can diminish the scope of the Clause’s reach through its enactments as well. If Congress has this power, even “judicial Proceedings” are
fair game, and all of DOMA Section 2 may be constitutional, a conclusion
that threatens the stability of same-sex parent adoptions, custody orders,
and divorces. There is scholarly support for both views— one being that
the implementing provision gives Congress the authority to reduce as well
as expand the reach of the full faith and credit obligation208 and the other
being that the provision is a “ratchet,” that gives Congress the authority to
expand (as it did in the child support and child custody contexts), but not
contract, the reach of the obligation.209
While the extent of Congress’s authority under the implementing provision is an open question, the “expansion only” reading is, in our view,
the better reading. Our interpretation emphasizes the important role a
strong full faith and credit obligation has played in finally settling the
problems created by the American family law federalism regime. And
while the broader reading of Congress’s enforcement powers is not precluded by the language or history of the Clause, other constitutional protections, including the right to travel, raise serious questions about
Congress’s authority to curtail states’ full faith and credit obligations in
this context. It is largely through the Court’s enforcement of strong full
faith and credit obligations in the context of divorce that the United States
has escaped the scandal associated with what the Australian framers saw
206. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 2.
207. STRASSER, supra note 199, at 70.
208. Sack, supra note 182, at 529 (arguing that Congress has the power to “both
diminish and expand the amount of full faith and credit owed . . . until and unless the
Court provides a definitive interpretation of what the Constitution requires”); Whitten,
supra note 70, at 291 (finding “compelling” historical evidence “that Congress was
intended to have broad power to create statutes like DOMA under the effects Clause”).
209. See Jeffrey M. Schmitt, A Historical Reassessment of Full Faith and Credit, 20 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 485, 485– 88 (2013). See also TRIBE, supra note 15, at 1274, n.49; 142
Congressional Record 13359– 61 (1996) (letter from Lawrence H. Tribe to Senator
Edward M. Kennedy). Under Australian law, Quick and Garran have read the Australian
Full Faith and Credit provision as just such a one-way ratchet. See QUICK & GARRAN,
supra note 44, at 620, 961; Geoffrey Lindell, Constitutional Issues Regarding Same-Sex
Marriage: A Comparative Survey – North America and Australasia, 30 SYDNEY L. REV. 29,
49 (2008).
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as a ”blot.”That same end should be achieved through that same means for
marriage.
ii. Federalism Constraints on DOMA Section 3
In a federalism regime where states are understood to control matters
of family law, Congress’s creation of a federal definition of marriage that
excluded validly married same-sex couples is striking. It was not, however,
an unconstitutional exercise of authority simply because the Constitution
does not confer legislative authority over marriage among Congress’s enumerated powers. It is undisputed that Congress has the authority to enact
legislation that affects the family under its various enumerated powers.
For example, Congress has the authority to establish legislation regulating
activity that affects interstate commerce, or that involves the spending of
federal money “for the general welfare.”210 Moreover, Congress has broad
discretion to set eligibility conditions for any programs or benefits that it
has the constitutional authority to enact through legislation.211 Thus,
Congress may set the terms of the federal programs that provide benefits to
married people, assuming that those programs were created pursuant to a
valid federal power. And while the Tenth Amendment has been construed
to impose some additional constraints on Congress’s intrusion on states’
authority,212 these constraints neither raise problems for Congress’s enactment of DOMA’s Section 3 nor apply with any special force in the area of
family law. In Gill v. Office of Personnel Management, the First Circuit
rejected arguments that challenged these conclusions.213
Although Congress’s enumerated powers were generally understood to
be broad enough to authorize its enactment of DOMA Section 3, the statute
was also challenged, and ultimately struck down, as a violation of individuals’ equal protection and due process rights under the United States Constitution. Because the Supreme Court’s analysis of DOMA Section 3 in
210. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 1, 3.
211. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 420 (1819) (“let the end be
legitimate . . . all means which are appropriate . . . which are not prohibited . . . are
constitutional”); see South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (conditions on federal
spending are legitimate if they are related to the particular spending purpose being
furthered).
212. U.S. CONST. amend. X. It has been argued that DOMA violates the “anti-commandeering principle” of the Tenth Amendment, established in New York v. United
States. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 161 (“Congress may not simply ‘commandeer the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and
enforce a federal regulatory program.’” (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981))). This particular line of argument seems weak,
as, under DOMA, Congress does not direct the state legislature to enact legislation nor
direct any state official to do anything other than abide by the limitations of the federal
funding grant; that limitation on the state’s discretion might have been unconstitutional
under an earlier Tenth Amendment doctrine. See Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833, 843 (1976) (finding that the Tenth Amendment expressly holds that “Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States’ integrity or their ability to function effectively in a federal system”). However, that case was overruled by
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority. 469 U.S. 528, 547– 55 (1985).
213. See generally Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D.Mass. 2010).
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Windsor focused on these federal civil rights, we consider the emergence of
these rights before discussing the Court’s invalidation of Section 3 in that
case.
iii. Constitutional Rights of Liberty and Equality
When the Fourteenth Amendment added the words, “No state
shall,”214 to the Constitution of the United States, it made a fundamental
change in American Federalism.215 That addition of federal to state protection of civil rights, which has no Australian constitutional parallel,216 was
controversial and evolved only slowly.217 The first indication of this
change in the context of family law occurred early in the Twentieth Century when the Supreme Court of the United States struck down state educational restrictions that interfered with parents’ ability to control the
upbringing of their children.218 Over the course of the Twentieth Century,
the Supreme Court recognized rights of childrearing,219 marriage,220 procreation,221 and family formation222 under the Due Process and Equal
214. U.S.CONST., Amend. XIV, §1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”).
215. The Congressional leaders who sponsored the Fourteenth Amendment were consciously changing Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833), which held that the original
Bill of Rights (Amendments 1– 8) did not apply to the states because the Constitution
omitted these words. See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION (1998) (summarizing the words of these leaders: 164– 65, 181, 182,
183 (Representative John Bingham); 184– 85 (Representative James Wilson); 185 (Representative Thaddeus Stevens); 186 (Senator Jacob Howard)).
216. The Australian framers rejected proposals based on the American Fourteenth
Amendment at the 1898 Melbourne Convention. See, Deb. Of the Australasian Fed.
Convention, Melbourne, 8 Feb. 1898, 664– 91. The reasons for the rejection are controversial. See George Williams, Human Rights Under the Australian Constitution, (1999), at
25 (arguing that racism – not democracy, the common law, and responsible government
– was the reason); John Williams, “Race, Citizenship and the Foundation of the Australian
Constitution: Andrew Inglis Clark and the 14th Amendment, 42 AUSTRL. J. POL. & HIST. 10,
18– 19 (1996). Inglis Clark, the primary proponent of these rejected proposals, see, e.g.,
memo quoted in JOHN WILLIAMS, THE AUSTRALIA CONSTITUTION: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
708– 09 (2005), later defended the American Supreme Court’s narrow and much-criticized reading of the Fourteenth Amendment in the Slaughter House Cases, 83 US (16
Wall.) 36 (1872), because, in Clark’s view, a broader reading would “radically [change]
the whole theory of the relations of States and Federal Government to each other, and of
both these Governments to the people,” A.INGLIS CLARK, STUDIES IN AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 378 (1901).
217. See AMAR supra note 216 at 181– 230; TRIBE, supra note 15, at 1297– 1320,
1332– 43,1362– 71.
218. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (holding unconstitutional a state law
prohibiting the teaching of German); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)
(holding unconstitutional a state law prohibiting the use of private schools). Note that
rights of parental authority were among those rights that the Australian Framers identified as appropriately reserved for the states. See supra notes 34– 45 and accompanying
text.
219. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
220. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
221. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965).
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Protection Clauses. It was not until the approach of the Twenty-First century, however, that the federal courts began recognizing the federal civil
rights of same-sex couples, raising the prospect of a marked shift from
state to federal control over the controversial social issue of same-sex marriage. We begin with a brief overview of the relevant equal protection and
due process doctrine, and then go on to discuss the doctrine’s application
to same-sex marriage.
Under its due process analysis,223 the Court has protected the “right
to marry”224 and struck down state-imposed conditions on who may
marry225 and on how marital couples may conduct their private affairs.226
Most directly applicable to same-sex couples (though outside the context of
marriage), the Court found in Lawrence v. Texas that a same-sex couple’s
due process rights include the right to engage in private sexual conduct
without government interference.227 While this due process doctrine has
played an important role in the analysis of same-sex marriage rights, it was
overshadowed by equal protection doctrine in the lead up to the Supreme
Court’s Windsor decision.
The Equal Protection Clause228 has been interpreted to afford three
different levels, or “tiers,” of protection depending upon which classes of
individuals are being treated differently under the law. At one extreme,
laws that treat people differently on the basis of the highly suspect classifications of race and national origin are subject to the highest level of scrutiny, and are rarely, if ever, constitutionally permissible.229 At the other
extreme, laws that distinguish between groups of individuals who are enti222. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
223. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. These rights are often referred to as “substantive
due process” rights, as these rights impose limits on actions that the government can
take that would infringe on individual liberties rather than simply requiring the government to provide a certain process before so infringing. Erwin Chemerinsky, Substantive
Due Process, 15 TOURO L. REV. 1501, 1501– 02 (1999).
224. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399 (determining that the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment includes “without doubt” “the right of the individual to . . . marry, establish
a home and bring up children”).
225. Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78, 99– 100 (1987) (finding that restrictions imposed
on prison inmates’ right to marry violated their due process rights); Loving, 388 U.S. at
12 (striking down interracial marriage ban on due process as well as equal protection
grounds). See also Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 395– 96 (Stewart, J., concurring) (contending
that Wisconsin’s law, which prevented fathers with unmet child support obligations
from remarrying, should be struck down on due process, rather than equal protection
grounds).
226. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485– 86 (“Marriage is a coming together for better or for
worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred”).
227. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003); Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v.
Texas: The ‘Fundamental Right’ that Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1893
(2004).
228. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Court has also construed the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment to contain an “Equal Protection” component that applies
to the federal government. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1953), and it was this
provision that was interpreted in Windsor.
229. See Mass Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976) (stating that laws burdening a suspect class are “presumptively invalid” and can be upheld “only upon an
extraordinary justification”).
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tled to no special protection are subject to deferential rational basis review,
and are generally upheld.230 Within this tier, however, the Court has
rejected as illegitimate laws based on “animus” or the “bare desire to harm
a politically unpopular group.”231 In between the most and least protected
classifications are those sometimes designated as quasi-suspect. These
classifications, including those based on gender and legitimacy, are entitled to intermediate scrutiny, which requires courts to ask whether the
challenged classification is substantially related to an important government interest— a standard said to call for a “genuine” and “exceedingly persuasive” explanation.232
At the time that the fifty-state experimentation with same-sex marriage began, there were two Supreme Court cases that addressed the rights
of gay and lesbians under the Equal Protection Clause. The first was Baker
v. Nelson, a summary dismissal of an appeal from a Minnesota Supreme
Court decision finding no equal protection violation in Minnesota’s ban on
same-sex marriage.233 This decision is directly on point, but old enough
that it predates both the doctrine’s introduction of intermediate scrutiny
and the massive change in social views and practices relating to homosexuality. Baker included no analysis because the Supreme Court dismissed it
for “want of a substantial federal question.”234
The second case, decided the same year that DOMA was enacted, was
Romer v. Evans, in which the Court applied the “animus” qualification of
the rational basis test to a law discriminating against gays and lesbians.235
Thus, as the states’ same-sex marriage experiments were getting underway,
the federal equal protection doctrine was just beginning to be applied to the
classification of sexual orientation. The fifty-state laboratory for the institution of same-sex marriage included within it a fifty-state judicial laboratory for the equal protection doctrine under state constitutions, to which
other courts, state and federal, could look in developing their own equal
protection doctrine.
Early in this experimentation, very little parallel development of federal constitutional law was occurring in federal court. By 2012, however,
three federal courts had weighed in, with two upholding state bans236 and
one striking down a ban.237 This third case, which began life as Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, struck down California’s Proposition 8— the referendum
230. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993) (stating that there is a “strong presumption of validity” under rational basis review).
231. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985); Dep’t of
Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 537– 38 (1973).
232. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
233. Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
234. Id.
235. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996).
236. Jackson v. Abercrombie, 884 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1119 (D. Haw. 2012) (holding
that Baker controlled, and, even if it did not, Hawaii’s marriage laws were rationally
related to a legitimate government interest); Citizens for Equal Prot. v. Bruning, 455 F.3d
859, 871 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that Nebraska’s laws limiting marriage to heterosexual couples was rationally related to a legitimate state interest).
237. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012).
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that amended California’s Constitution to limit marriage to opposite sex
couples— after the California Supreme Court had interpreted the state constitution to require the recognition of same-sex marriages.238 The Northern District of California struck down the law on both equal protection and
due process grounds, finding that the law violated the same-sex couples’
fundamental right to marry, and could not be justified under any level of
equal protection scrutiny.239 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
the district court’s ruling, but grounded the result narrowly on its finding
that animus against gays and lesbians motivated the referendum.240 The
Supreme Court thereafter granted certiorari, scheduling oral argument
back-to-back with the argument in Windsor.
Granting certiorari in Perry opened up the prospect that the Court
would end the fifty-state experiment by declaring same-sex marriage a constitutional right of all citizens throughout the nation. This prospect was a
source of considerable concern, not only for opponents of same-sex marriage, but also for many supporters who feared that a nationwide decision
made swiftly by the Supreme Court would undermine popular acceptance
of same-sex marriage and the development of the emerging national consensus.241 The Court’s attempt to avoid, or at least forestall, that result is
part of the federalism story that we will take up in conjunction with our
discussion of the Court’s analysis in Windsor.
iv. The Interrelationship between the “Push” of DOMA and the “Pull”
of Individual Rights
The validity of same-sex marriage prohibitions under the Equal Protection Clause has obvious relevance to the validity of Sections 2 and 3 of
DOMA. States cannot refuse to recognize marriages that are protected
under the United States Constitution, nor can Congress direct states to do
so. And the federal government cannot define marriage to exclude couples
to whom the Constitution gives the right to marry. If the Supreme Court
had wanted to resolve the issue in favor of same-sex marriage once and for
all on a national level, it could have swept all of DOMA away with the same
doctrinal brush that would eliminate all state diversity. Before considering
the steps taken by the Court in Perry and Windsor to avoid imposing a
238. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1003 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
239. Id. at 1004.
240. Perry, 671 F.3d at 1112.
241. Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Dalia Sussman, Same-Sex Marriage is Seen in Poll as an
Issue for the States, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/07/
us/politics/states-should-decide-gay-marriage-poll-finds.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
(reporting results of a New York Times/CBS News poll showing that a solid majority of
Americans oppose a broad national right to same-sex marriage and prefer for the issue
to be decided by the states, despite the fact that they support marriage equality for gay
people); but see John Samples & Emily Ekins, Public Attitudes Toward Federalism, CATO
INSTITUTE POLICY ANALYSIS, 14– 16 (Sept. 23, 2014), available at http://object.cato.org/
sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa759_web.pdf (reporting ambiguous and somewhat
conflicting survey data about popular preferences for state and federal regulation of
same-sex marriage).
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federal solution, we consider how equal protection challenges to Section 3
were handled in the lower federal courts.
Most of the federal courts that considered equal protection challenges
to DOMA’s Section 3 prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Windsor
found that Section 3 violated same-sex couples’ equal protection rights.242
In some of these decisions, the courts applied only rational basis review,
and concluded that Section 3 of DOMA could not survive even that lowest
level of scrutiny.243 In other decisions, courts found that distinctions
based on sexual orientation were entitled to heightened scrutiny.244 Some
of these courts nevertheless went on to conclude that DOMA failed rational
basis review,245 while the Second Circuit in Windsor suggested that heightened scrutiny might be required to invalidate the law.246 Most interesting
for our purposes is the significance courts found in Congress’s departure
from the deference it generally afforded states in determining who qualified as married under federal law. According to many of these opinions,
this departure from federalist traditions rendered the purported aims of the
Act suspect, under equal protection analysis.247
This idea was starkly expressed in Massachusetts v. U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services,248 in which the First Circuit struggled to find a
242. See Windsor v. U.S., 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012); Mass. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health
and Human Services., 682 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2012); Golinksi v. Office of Pers. Mgmt.,
824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 1002 (N.D. Calif. 2012)Dragovich v. U.S. Dep’t. of Treasury, 872 F.
Supp. 2d 944, 954, 964 (N.D. Cal. 2012); Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 881 F. Supp.
2d 294, 347 (D. Conn. 2012) (all striking down DOMA Section 3 as an equal protection
violation); but see Smelt v. County of Orange, 374 F. Supp. 2d 861 (C.D. Cal. 2005),
vacated in part, 447 F.3d 673 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding that plaintiffs failed to meet their
burden of showing that Section 3 of DOMA was not rationally related to any legitimate
government purpose).
243. See Dragovich, 872 F. Supp. 2d at 963– 64 (finding that section 3 of DOMA failed
rational basis review, and that its enactment was motivated by anti-gay animus). The
First Circuit in Massachusetts v. Dept. of Health and Human Services also applied rational
basis review, but engaged in a somewhat unique analysis. See infra notes 250– 55 and
accompanying text.
244. See Windsor, 699 F.3d at 185; Pedersen, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 333; Golinski, 824 F.
Supp. 2d. at 989– 90 .
245. See Pedersen, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 333 (stating that heightened scrutiny applied,
but disposing of the challenge under rational basis review); Golinski, 824 F. Supp. 2d at
1002 (finding that Section 3 fails even rational basis test).
246. Windsor, 699 F.3d at 180– 81 (noting that the existence of a rational basis for
Section 3 of DOMA is “closely argued” and declining to address whether DOMA could
withstand rational basis review, relying instead on its application of heightened scrutiny
which it concludes is constitutionally required).
247. See, e.g., Windsor, 699 F.3d at 186 (“Because DOMA is an unprecedented breach
of longstanding deference to federalism that singles out same-sex marriage as the only
inconsistency (among many) in state law that requires a federal rule to achieve uniformity, the rationale premised on uniformity is not an exceedingly persuasive justification
for DOMA”); Golinski, 824 F. Supp. 2d at 1000 (“The passage of DOMA marks a stark
departure from tradition and a blatant disregard of the well-accepted concept of federalism in the area of domestic relations”); Dragovich, 872 F. Supp. 2d at 956– 57 (“Given the
federal government’s long-standing deference to state law in the area of domestic relations, the BLAG’s rationale that the provision was a cautionary measure is not
plausible”).
248. 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012).
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place for American family law federalism norms within the equal protection doctrine. In the view of the court, the plaintiffs could not prevail
under the rational basis standard “traditionally applied in routine matters
of commercial, tax and like regulations.”249 The court further concluded
that the plaintiffs were not entitled to heightened scrutiny under circuit
precedent, and noted, apparently as a cautionary statement, that the application of a heightened standard might have the effect, not only of overruling DOMA, but also of “overturn[ing] marriage laws in a huge majority of
individual states.”250 Instead, the First Circuit rested its holding on a blend
of the animus line of rational basis cases, and its assertion that “in areas
where state regulation has traditionally governed, the Court may require
that the federal government interest in intervention be shown with special
clarity.”251 Thus, this case can be understood as applying two forms of
“rational basis plus” review: one to ensure that distinctions were not based
on a “bare Congressional desire to harm an unpopular group” and the second based on DOMA’s extensive intrusion “into a realm that has from the
start of the nation been primarily confided to state regulation.”252 While
the first basis, “animus,” was well supported by doctrine, the second basis,
federalism, was new. Tying this federalism focus to its less deferential
rational basis approach, the First Circuit explained:
These consequences [imposed by DOMA] do not violate the Tenth Amendment or spending Clause, but Congress’s effort to put a thumb on the scales
and influence a state’s decision as to how to shape its own marriage laws
does bear on how the justifications are assessed . . . Given that DOMA
intrudes broadly into an area of traditional state regulation, a closer examination of the justifications that would prevent DOMA from violating equal
protection (and thus from exceeding federal authority) is uniquely reinforced by federalism concerns.253

While this federalism theme played a much smaller role in the Second Circuit’s decision in Windsor,254 it became a central force in the subsequent
Supreme Court deliberations and decision.
249. Mass. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Services., 682 F.3d at 9 .
250. Id. at 10.
251. Id. at 9– 10.
252. Id. at 10, 12.
253. Id. at 12– 13.
254. One of the reasons the Second Circuit offered for its determination that it was
not bound by the Supreme Court’s 1972 dismissal of Baker was grounded in federalism:
While the U.S. Supreme Court had found that Minnesota’s state law prohibiting samesex marriage did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection
of the law, it was a different question whether a federal law denying the right to equal
access to marital benefits violated the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee.
Windsor, 699 F.3d at 178 . The court reasoned that the Constitution left marriage, like
most family law, to the states, and Section 3 of DOMA was an intrusion of the federal
government into the state’s terrain. Id. at 186. The Supreme Court in Baker might have
understandably left the states considerable discretion to determine which persons
should be given the privilege and related benefits of marriage, but no such deference
was owed to the federal government’s intrusion.
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v. The Supreme Court’s Path through Opposing National Pressures
During oral arguments in Windsor, the lawyers and justices gave a
great deal of attention to the states’ authority to regulate marriage, but
there was considerable uncertainty about how this federalism history was
relevant to the Court’s equal protection analysis.255 The connection was
drawn most expressly by Justice Kagan, in a lengthy comment from the
bench:
[F]or the most part and historically, the only uniformity that the Federal
Government has pursued is that it’s uniformly recognized the marriages that
are recognized by the State. So [DOMA reflects] a real difference in the uniformity that the Federal Government was pursuing. And it suggests that
maybe something— maybe Congress had something different in mind than
uniformityFalse
I guess the question that this statute raises, this statute that does something
that’s really never been done before, is whether that sends up a pretty good
red flag that. . .Congress’s judgment was infected by dislike, by fear, by animus, and so forth.256

This analysis appears to be the basis of the Court’s subsequent decision in Windsor overturning Section 3, though stated more obliquely in the
opinion. After discussing, at some length, the long “history and tradition”257 of leaving the definition and regulation of marriage to the states, a
history supported by Supreme Court precedent, the Court took pains, as
the First Circuit had in Massachusetts v. U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, to distinguish its Equal Protection analysis from any direct
reliance on the “principles of federalism.”258 Whatever might be permissible under the constitutional provisions governing the balance of power
between the federal government and the states, discriminations that reflect
an unusual departure from historical practice “suggest careful consideration to determine whether they are obnoxious” to the constitutional guarantee of equal protection.259 In Windsor, the history of family law
federalism serves as evidence rather than mandate, but in establishing the
basis for the protection of individual rights, the American family law federalism balance is afforded considerable protection.260
The Court’s apparent interest in avoiding any doctrinal development
not strictly necessary to resolve the constitutionality of DOMA Section 3 is
reflected in its complete avoidance of the question of the proper standard
255. This uncertainty was particularly well-captured in an ongoing exchange between
Solicitor General Verrilli and the Justices, regarding the question of whether DOMA Section 3 and/or hypothetical variations presented “a federalism problem.” See Oral Argument at 82– 85, U.S. v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307).
256. Id. at 72.
257. U.S. v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2691 (2013) (citing Haddock, 201 U.S. at 575
for the proposition that “the states, at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, possessed full power over the subject of marriage and divorce . . . and the Constitution
delegated no authority to [Congress] on the subject of marriage and divorce”).
258. See id. at 18– 24.
259. Id. at 19.
260. See id. at 18– 24.
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of scrutiny to apply,despite the fact that every opinion concerning samesex marriage leading up to the Windsor decision addressed the question, as
did all the lawyers litigating the case in the Supreme Court.261 The standard to be applied was widely assumed to be an important, if not a determinative, factor in resolving whether or not there was a federal
constitutional right to same-sex marriage. In avoiding the central doctrinal
question while lacing his majority opinion with commentary praising New
York for having recognized same-sex marriage and disparaging DOMA’s
degrading and demeaning effect, Justice Kennedy gave litigants, courts, and
legislators some powerful rhetoric to work with, without more directly
advancing the doctrinal march toward a federal same-sex marriage rule.262
Federalism concerns, and particularly the value of fifty-state experimentation, were also clearly on the minds of the Supreme Court Justices in
their consideration of Perry, though their concerns in this case pressed
against the recognition of an equal protection right. During oral argument,
several of the Justices returned repeatedly to the “newness” of the same-sex
marriage experiment, and contrasted that experiment to the thousands of
years of aggregate data on opposite-sex marriage that was purportedly
reflected in a majority of the states’ laws.263 The concern pressed by lawyers arguing for reversal and taken up by some of the Justices, was that a
recognition of an equal protection right to same-sex marriage would either
stop the experimentation altogether (by finding that all states were constitutionally required to recognize same-sex marriage) or severely distort the
experimentation (by more narrowly finding, as the Ninth Circuit had done,
that states that afforded full rights to same-sex couples other than the title
of marriage were constitutionally required to give them the title as well, but
leaving states affording lesser rights free from constitutional constraints).264 The risks associated with imposing a national mandate in this
area of “uncharted waters” may have encouraged Justice Kennedy to focus
on the “substantial question of standing” in Perry and wonder aloud
whether Supreme Court review of the case had been improperly
granted.265 And in the end, that standing issue allowed the Court to avoid
answering the constitutional question that threatened to shut down the
state laboratories.266
In these two cases, announced on the same day, the Supreme Court
found a way to resist both the national legislative pressure against and the
national judicial pressure favoring same-sex marriage. In Windsor, the
Court squeezed family law federalism into its equal protection doctrine in
a way that afforded states protection to control and experiment with samesex marriage under the guise of individual rights. In Perry, it relied on
261. Brief for Petitioner at 36, U.S. v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307);
Brief for Respondent at 17, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307).
262. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692– 95.
263. See Oral Argument at 18– 22, 55– 57, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652
(2010) (No. 12-144).
264. Id. at 18– 22.
265. Id. at 47– 48.
266. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2668 (2013).
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standing to avoid a decision addressing those rights that might have distorted that experimentation or prematurely foreclosed the experimentation
altogether. In short, in these two cases, the Supreme Court made use of
constitutional doctrine to protect precisely the state of affairs that the Australians had decried a century ago.
vi. Federal Court Developments after Windsor and Perry
Despite the Supreme Court’s efforts to keep the evolution of the law
governing same-sex marriage in the hands of the states, its decision in
Windsor set in motion a series of federal district court rulings that
addressed the federal constitutionality of state same-sex marriage bans.
The vast majority of these cases struck down the bans,267 and most of
these cases were subsequently affirmed on appeal.268 When the Sixth Circuit’s reversal of the district court rulings in four states269 produced a circuit split, however, the Supreme Court agreed, in January of 2015, to hear
the cases. If the Supreme Court rules that state same-sex marriage bans
violate citizens’ constitutional rights, as it is widely expected to do by the
267. Of the following twenty-eight federal district court rulings that have addressed
the constitutionality of same-sex marriage bans since Windsor, twenty-six have held that
these bans are unconstitutional on due process grounds, equal protections grounds, or
both. Compare Searcy v. Strange, No. 1:14-cv-00208-CG-N, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7776
(S. D. Ala. Jan. 23, 2015); Rosenbrahn v. Daugaard, No. 4:14-CV-04081-KES, 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 4018 (D. S.D. Jan. 12, 2015); Campaign for Southern Equality v. Bryant,
NO. 3:14-CV-818-CWR-LRA, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165913 (S. D. Miss., Nov. 25,
2014);, Jernigan v. Crane, No. 4:13-cv-00410 KGB, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165898 (E.D.
Ark. Nov. 25, 2014), Rolando v. Fox, 23 F. Supp. 3d 1227 (Dist. Mont. Nov. 19, 2014);
Condon v. Haley, 21 F. Supp. 3d 572 (D. S.C. Nov. 12, 2014); Lawson v. Kelly, No. 140622-CV-W-ODS, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157802, at *31– 32 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 7, 2014);
McGee v. Cole, No. 3:13-24068, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158680, at *29– 32 (S.D. W. Va.
Nov. 7, 2014); Marie v. Moser, No. 14-cv-02518-DDC/TJJ, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157093
(D. Kan. Nov. 4, 2014); Guzzo v. Mead, No. 14-CV-200-SWS, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
148481, at *12 (D. Wyo. Oct. 17, 2014); Burns v. Hickenlooper, No. 14-cv-01817-RMKLM, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148123, at *3 (D. Colo. Oct. 17, 2014); Majors v. Horne, 14
F. Supp. 3d 1313, 1315– 16 (D. Ariz. Oct. 17, 2014); Hamby v. Parnell, No. 3:14-cv00089-TMB, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145876, at *34 (D. Alaska Oct. 12, 2014); General
Synod of the United Church of Christ v. Resinger, 12 F. Supp. 3d 790 (W.D. N.C. Oct.
10, 2014);, Brenner v. Scott, 999 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1281– 82 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 2014);,
Love v. Beshear, 989 F. Supp. 2d 536, 550 (W.D. Ky. July 21, 2014);, Baskin v. Bogan, 12
F. Supp. 3d 1144, 1164 (S.D. Ind. June 25, 2014); Wolf v. Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d 982,
1028 (W.D. Wis. June 6, 2014);, Whitewood v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410, 431 (M.D. Pa.
May 20, 2014);, Geiger v. Kitzhaber, 994 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1147 (D. Or. May 19, 2014);,
Latta v. Otter, 19 F. Supp. 3d 1054 (D. Idaho May 13, 2014); DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F.
Supp. 2d 757, 775 (E.D. Mich. March 21, 2014); DeLeon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632,
639 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 2014); Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 480 (E.D. Va. Feb.
13, 2014); Bishop v. Oklahoma, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1295– 96 (N.D. Okla. Jan. 14,
2014), and Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1216 (D. Utah Dec. 20, 2013),
with Conde-Vidal v. Garcia-Padilla, No. 14-1253 (PG) (Dist P.R. Oct. 21, 2014) and
Robicheaux v. Caldwell, 2 F. Supp. 3d 910 September 3, 2014 slip op. (E.D. La. Sept. 3,
2014).
268. Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2014); Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th
Cir. 2014); Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014); Kitchen v. Herbert, 755
F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014).
269. Deboer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014).
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end of the current term, it will displace state with federal law on this central contemporary issue of family law.
Thus, the Supreme Court’s apparent maneuvering in Windsor and
Perry may have only bought the 50-state experiment two more years, and
critics might emphasize that these two years have been dominated by federal, not state, developments. While the shift to federal litigation has certainly been pronounced, it has not extinguished ongoing state
developments, which have included the recognition of same-sex marriage
in two states by legislation270 and in two states by court decisions interpreting state constitutional provisions.271
Moreover, the federal district court decisions themselves have a local
dimension that might be seen to temper the shift from state to national
control. Beginning in Utah, the federal district courts have interpreted and
applied federal constitutional law one state at a time— indeed, sometimes
in units smaller than the entire state— through judges whose professional
and political lives are often deeply rooted in these communities.272 And
working alongside these federal district judges were a number of state
court judges, who have also in all but one case concluded that their own
states’ same-sex marriage bans violated the U.S. Constitution.273
In reaching their decisions, the federal district courts introduced local
variations, reflecting an ongoing laboratory of analysis. These state-level
variations in federal analysis were further differentiated by the range of
state government responses to the federal rulings. In many states, the trial
court’s ruling prompted an abandonment of the state’s support of the ban
by some or all state government officials.274 Moreover, the federal decisions swiftly led in some states (those whose rulings were not immediately
stayed) to marriages— marriages that dramatically demonstrated the num270. Hawaii Marriage Equality Act of 2013, Haw Rev. Stat. Sec. 572; Illinois Religious
Freedom and Marriage Fairness Act (2013), 750 Ill. Comp. State 5/201.
271. Garden State Equality v. Dow, 434 N.J. Super. 163 — 82 A.3d 336 (2013); Greigo
v. Oliver 2014-NMSC-003 — 316 P.3d 865 (2013).
272. See Emily Buss, Federal Court Federalism, in draft. On file with the authors.
273. Compare Wright v. Arkansas, 2014 Ark. 25, No. CR-12-706; In Re Marriage of
J.B. and H.B., 326 S.W.3d 654 (Tex. App.— Dallas 2010); A.L.F.L. v. K.L.L., No. 2014-CI02421 (438th Dist. Ct., Bexar County, Tex. April 22, 2014); Brinkman v. Long, No. 13CV-32572 (Colo. D. Ct. July 9, 2014); Pareto v. Ruvin, No. 2014-001661-CA-01 (Fla.
11th Cir. Ct. July 25, 2014); Huntsman v. Heavilin, No. 2014-CA-305-K (Fla. 16th Cir.
Ct. July 17, 2014); In re Costanza and Brewer, No. 13-01049-CA (La. Ct. App. 2013);and
State of Missouri v. Florida, 2014 WL 5654040 (Mo. Cir. Ct. 2014) with Borman v. Pyles-Borman, No. 2014CV36 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Aug. 5, 2014).
274. In Pennsylvania and Oregon, state officials chose not to appeal. John Bacon &
Richard Wolf, Pa. Governor Won’t Appeal Ruling Legalizing Gay Marriage, USA TODAY
(May 21, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/05/20/pennsylva
nia-gay-marriage-ruling/9323521/. In Virginia, the Attorney General refused to defend
the ban on appeal, but other government officials pursued the appeal. See Richard Wolf,
Virginia Won’t Defend Its Same-Sex Marriage Ban, USA TODAY (Jan. 23, 2014), http://
www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2014/01/23/virginia-ag-gay-marriage/4791
715/. In several states, court clerks, with responsibilities for issuing marriage licenses,
took diverse positions in the federal litigation. See John Adams et al., Across the USA:
Reaction to Same-Sex Marriage Decision, USA TODAY (Oct. 10, 2014), http://www.usa
today.com/story/news/nation/2014/10/06/same-sex-marriages-states/16803631/.
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ber of citizens whose lives had been constrained by their states’ same-sex
marriage bans. Most strikingly, in Utah, in the two weeks between the
district court decision striking down the state’s ban on same-sex marriage
and the Supreme Court’s imposition of a stay of the district court’s order,
more than 1,000 same-sex marriages were performed in that state
alone.275 And when, in October, 2014, the Supreme Court denied certiorari and lifted the stays imposed in cases from three Circuit Courts, the
news coverage was full of images of couples who immediately wed.276
A number of federal courts have also relied on Windsor to conclude
that states are constitutionally required to recognize marriages validly performed in other states.277 These decisions are based, like the decisions
striking down states’ own same-sex marriage bans, on interpretations of
the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, or both.278 Notably
absent from these opinions is any consideration of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause or of DOMA Section 2, which exempts states from an obligation to give full faith and credit to same-sex marriages celebrated in other
states. Of course, if the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
United States Constitution require states to recognize these validly entered
out-of-state marriages, as these district courts have concluded, then no act
of Congress can authorize states to avoid that obligation. As we await the
Supreme Court’s decision in the Sixth Circuit cases, the constitutional
validity of DOMA Section 2 remains an open question. And even if the
right to same-sex marriage will ultimately be framed in federal constitutional terms— as appears likely— the authority of Congress to curtail the
interstate stability of a family’s status in other contexts remains an important question for the United States’ federalism regime.
B. Same-Sex Marriage in Australia
As in the United States, the constitutional law on same-sex marriage in
Australia changed dramatically in 2013. Prior to the High Court’s decision
in Commonwealth of Australia v. Australian Capital Territory (ACT),279 the
state of the law was in great doubt. Although both state and federal law
were moving forward toward recognizing and protecting the interests of
same-sex couples in Australia, same-sex marriage was largely avoided.280
As noted, the most important question in the United States, answered nega275. Josh Gerstein, Obama Administration to Recognize Utah Same-Sex Marriages,
POLITICO (Jan. 10, 2014), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/01/same-sex-marriagesutah-102022.html.
276. See Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Delivers Tacit Win to Gay Marriage, N.Y. Times,
(October 6, 2014).
277. See, e.g., Love v. Beshear, 989 F. Supp. 2d 536, 550 (W.D. Ky. 2014); Baskin v.
Bogan, 12 F. Supp. 3d 1144, 1164 (S.D. Ind. 2014); Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F.
Supp. 2d 968, 973 (S.D. Ohio 2013).
278. See, e.g., Obergefell, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 973 (“[H]ere, the constitutional due process right at issue is not the right to marry, but, instead, the right not to be deprived of
one’s already-existing legal marriage and its attendant benefits and protections”).
279. Commonwealth v Australian Capital Territory (2013) 250 CLR 411.
280. See discussion infra Part III.B.1.
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tively by the Supreme Court in 2013, was whether Congress has legislative
power to deny all marriage-based federal benefits to same-sex couples validly married under state law.281 In Australia, two important questions
were answered by the High Court. The first, answered in the affirmative,
was whether the Commonwealth Parliament had legislative power to recognize and regulate same-sex marriages.282 The second, answered in the negative, was whether states could recognize and regulate same-sex marriage if
the federal Parliament chose not to do so.283
Those two important High Court decisions have left open many constitutional questions— legal and political— relating to federalism. The ultimate political question remaining is whether the Commonwealth
Parliament will exercise its power to recognize same-sex marriages (and, if
it does so, when and under what terms). In addition,there remain difficult
questions of the scope of the state’s power to regulate same-sex couples
and their families, questions that go to both the continuing validity of state
laws currently on the books and to the states’ ability to enact new laws that
might move them closer to the recognition of a status legally equivalent to
marriage. Before setting out the High Court’s decision in Commonwealth v.
ACT and the federalism issues that remain, we describe the state and federal developments in the recognition of same-sex couples that preceded
that decision.
1. The Developing Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships from State
Laboratories of Experimentation to Federal Law
Over the past two decades, the law in Australia has been inching forward in an expanded recognition of families headed by same-sex couples.
We break these developments into two categories in order to better plot the
respective contributions made by the states and the federal government
and the interaction among them. The first category of legal development is
the movement toward recognition of same-sex relationships and equal
treatment of those relationships without calling them “marriage.” The
developments in this first category can be traced in a fairly straight line
from state law, to state referral under section 51(xxxvii), to federal law,
although some state variation remains. The second category is movement
toward the recognition of parent-child relationships between both members
of same-sex couples and their children. The developments in this second
category reflect a complicated combination of state and federal law
addressing access to fertility services and adoption, the assignment of parentage, and the allocation of parental responsibility.
a. Regulation of the Couple’s Relationship
The recognition of same-sex relationships began in the states and grew
out of a state-based movement for the recognition of non-marital, opposite281. See discussion supra Part III.A.3.v.
282. Commonwealth v ACT (2013) 250 CLR at 454, ¶ 9.
283. See id. at 468, ¶ 59.
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sex couples.284 In response to trends in cohabitation outside of marriage,
the Australian states developed a range of legal schemes recognizing “de
facto” relationships.285 These schemes of regulation were the work of the
states because they regulated relationships outside the scope of the federal
Parliament’s marriage authority. They took their point of departure from
the felt need to provide certain benefits and protections (previously available only to married couples) to unmarried couples. Over time, these state
de facto regimes came to include same-sex couples as well.286 While the
recognition of same-sex relationships grew out of state laws designed to
recognize non-marital, opposite-sex relationships, the non-marital focus for
same-sex couples was likely reinforced by uncertainties surrounding states’
constitutional authority to regulate marriage, an uncertainty complicated
by the federal Parliament’s amendment of the Marriage Act in 2004 to
expressly limit marriage to “the union of a man and a woman to the exclusion of all others voluntarily entered into for life.”287
Over the course of this evolution, these laws governing de facto relationships were often borrowed and modified by other states— the starting
point of this regulatory pattern being generally placed in New South
Wales.288 Notwithstanding the influence of state-to-state interaction, the
various state laws were not uniform289 and had limited reciprocal recognition.290 The lack of uniformity among state laws and between state and
federal laws coupled with increasing pressure for national legislation protecting unmarried couples led to consideration and, eventually, invocation
of the Commonwealth’s referral power under section 51(xxxvii). At
roughly the same time Parliament made clear that its definition of marriage
did not include same-sex couples, states began to refer their power over de
facto relationships (by definition, not “marriage” under xxi), to the Commonwealth Parliament under section 51 (xxxvii).291 Adding to the pressure for a national law was the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity
Commission’s “national inquiry into discrimination against people in
same-sex relationships,” which concluded that there was widespread dispa284. See BELINDA FEHLBERG & JULIET BEHRENS, AUSTRALIAN FAMILY LAW, THE CONTEMPOCONTEXT 136– 38 (2008).
285. See, e.g., De Facto Relationships Act 1984 (NSW); Property Law (Amendment Act)
1987 (Vic).
286. See, e.g., Property (Relationships) Act 1984 (NSW); Statute Law Amendment (Relationships) Act 2001 (Vic) (amending state de facto relationship laws to include same-sex
couples)
287. Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) ss 5(1), 88(B)(4). This definition was understood to
reinforce a common understanding of what the term “marriage” meant under Australian
law. See Geoffrey Lindell, supra note 210, at 42. See also Hyde v. Hyde and Woodmansee [1886] 1 L.R.P. & D. 130, 133 (Eng.). This definition also repeated the language
already set out in the Family Law Act’s statement of principles, found in section 43(a),
and in the Marriage Act’s list of directions that are required to be provided to civil marriage celebrants. Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 43(1)(a); Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) s 46(1).
288. Kovacs, supra note 135, at 108.
289. See Adiva Sifris & Paula Gerber, Same-Sex Marriage in Australia: A Battleground
for Equality, 25 AUSTL. J. FAM. L. 96, 100 (2011); Kovacs, supra note 135, at 108.
290. See id, at 100.
291. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
RARY
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rate treatment of same-sex couples in a wide range of family law
matters.292
Spurred by these developments, the Commonwealth Parliament
enacted two pieces of legislation affecting the rights of same-sex couples in
2008: The Family Law Amendment (De Facto Financial Matters and Other
Measures) Act 2008, and the Same-Sex Relationships (Equal Treatment in
Commonwealth Law – General Law Reform) Act 2008.293 The Family Law
Amendment was enacted pursuant to the power received from five states
under subsection 51 (xxxvii).294 With the exception of Western Australia,
which has the unique ability to coordinate state and federal law in its state
family courts,295 the nation now has uniform law governing the dissolution of same-sex relationships. As with divorce, the uniform national law,
and the emerging consensus that supported the law, grew out of statebased experimentation.296 However, whereas in the context of divorce the
Commonwealth Parliament had the constitutional authority all along and
only needed to wait for a political consensus to act, here, in the context of
de facto relationship recognition, both the consensus and the constitutional authority to act on that consensus, emerged from the states.
The 2008 Amendments made substantial changes to the federal Family Law Act, affording rights set out in the Act to couples in “de facto relationships.”297 To determine whether a couple is in a de facto relationship,
the law looks to a number of factors,298 no one of which is controlling.299
292. See generally Same-Sex: Same Entitlements, HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUAL OPPORTUCOMM’N, 54– 117 (2007), available at https://www.humanrights.gov.au/sites/
default/files/content/human_rights/samesex/report/pdf/SSSE_Report.pdf.
293. See Lee Galloway, The Family Law Amendment (De Facto Financial Matters and
Other Measures) Bill— A Guide to Practice and Policy, 22 AUSTL. J. FAM. L. 93 (2008).
294. Four states referred that power, Commonwealth Powers (De Facto Relationships)
Act 2006 (Tas); Commonwealth Powers (De Facto Relationships) Act 2004 (Vic); Commonwealth Powers (De Facto Relationships) Act 2003 (NSW); Commonwealth Powers (De Facto
Relationships) Act 2003 (Qld), and a fifth, South Australia, in the language of the constitution “afterwards adopt[ed] the law.” Commonwealth Powers (De Facto Relationships) Act
2009 (SA). Western Australia adopted a de facto relationships act, but following its general pattern of withholding referrals and proceeding through its Family Court, it
referred only with respect to superannuation entitlements. Commonwealth Powers (De
Facto Relationship) Act 2006 (WA). See also Kovacs, supra note 135, at 114.
295. See supra notes 121– 22 and accompanying text.
296. See Scott Stephenson, Federalism and Rights Deliberation, 38 MELB. U. L. REV.
(forthcoming) 82– 111 (arguing that deliberation at the state level contributes to decision-making at the national level).
297. Unlike the nationally adopted term “de facto relationship,” state laws now generally use the term, “domestic relationship.” See Kovacs, supra note 135, at 104, 212.
298. The factors are the duration of the relationship (at least two years, subject to a
hardship exception); the nature and extent of common residence; the existence of a sexual relationship; financial support and dependence; ownership, use and acquisition of
property; degree of mutual commitment to a shared life; care and support of children;
and reputation and public aspects. Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 4AA(2). See, e.g., Juliet
Behrens, ‘De Facto Relationship?’ Some Early Case Law under the Family Law Act, 24
AUSTL. J. FAM. LAW. 350, 351– 52 (2010); Watts, supra note 135, at 123– 24; Kovacs,
supra note 135, at 114– 15. Moreover, to be in a de facto relationship, the parties must
live a sufficient period of the required two years in a participating jurisdiction, that is, a
state that has made a qualifying referral under section 51(xxxvii) or a federal territory
NITY
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The federal law has not entirely displaced state law in dealing with samesex domestic relationships.300 State registration301 may influence the
determination of whether a couple satisfies the de facto relationship
test.302 At least to this extent, the affected same-sex couples have to deal
with both lack of uniformity across state lines303 and lack of uniformity
between state and federal laws.304
While significant advancement in the recognition of same-sex partnerships was achieved through the De Facto Relationships Amendment, the
status of a de facto couple falls short of marriage in two respects, one operational and one symbolic. Operationally, the existence of a de facto relationship is based on a conclusion that some unspecified number of
unranked identified criteria are met, rather than on whether the couple
declares they are in a de facto relationship. No expression of commitment
or state endorsement, or even registration, is required.305 Indeed, it is possible for a person to be in a de facto relationship without knowing it or
even contrary to the intention of one or both members of the couple not to
have made any commitment.306 Moreover, the provisions of the Family
Law Act governing de facto relationships become operable (just as they do
for married couples) only when the relationship breaks down.307
Symbolically, “de facto” relationships are, by their terms, not “marriages.” To the extent that the same-sex marriage controversy is about the
which is covered by reason of the Commonwealth’s plenary power to legislate for territories under section 122; Western Australia does not satisfy this requirement because its
referral is limited to superannuation. Id.
299. See Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 4AA(3) (providing that “no particular finding in
relation to any circumstance is to be regarded as necessary in deciding whether persons
have a de facto relationship”); Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 4AA(4) (providing that in
determining whether a de facto relationship exists, a court is entitled “to attach such
weight to any matter, as may seem appropriate to the court in the circumstances of the
case”).
300. See Kovacs, supra note 135, at 119; Watts, supra note 135, at 122, 125.
301. Four states have registration schemes. Relationships Register Act 2010 (NSW) s
5; Civil Partnerships Act 2011 (Qld) s 6; Relationships Act 2003 (Tas) s 11; Relationships
Act 2008 (Vic) s 6.
302. Compare Watts, supra note 135, at 124 (suggesting that registration is “not determinative . . . [b]ut one factor, perhaps a powerful one”), with Kovacs, supra note 135, at
120 (concluding that registration “overcomes the need to prove” the two year period
spent in the cohabitation and the parties’ connection with a participating state).
303. See Sifris & Gerber, supra note 293, at 100 (discussing how registration schemes
are “not uniform” and there is “limited reciprocal recognition”).
304. See Watts, supra note 135, at 125 (noting the difficulty of a couple’s ability to
exercise an opt-in choice under section 86A because the difference between existing
state laws and the new federal law was often substantial and thus not equally favorable
to both parties); Behrens, supra note 295, at 357– 58 (suggesting a situation where,
because of doubt about the federal law’s applicability and the Family Court of Australia’s accrued jurisdiction, state court and state law might be preferred).
305. Indeed, ceremonies have been discouraged by the federal government as looking
too much like marriage. See Sifris & Gerber, supra note 293, at 103.
306. A person can be determined to be in more than one “de facto relationship” or
even simultaneously in a “de facto relationship” and a marriage. See Behrens, supra note
302, at 357; Kovacs, supra note 135, at 107; Watts, supra note 135, at 124.
307. See generally Behrens, supra note 302, at 354.
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access of same-sex couples to the specially recognized status of “marriage,”
de facto relationship recognition is a lower status substitute.308 Some individual Australian states have moved legal recognition closer to marriage by
providing for the registration of “civil partnerships,” but until November
2013, no state or territory had succeeded in testing the extent of its authority to recognize same-sex couples as married under state or territory
law.309
b. Regulation of the Parenting Relationship
A second category of legal developments concerning same-sex couples
is the growing recognition of parental claims, including claims of same-sex
partners who are not biologically related to their children. The story of
increasing equalization of treatment between children of same-sex and
opposite-sex couples is different from the story of equalization between
same-sex and opposite-sex couples themselves. Before the advent of concern about non-married couples and same-sex marriage, state and federal
law had detached children’s entitlement to the protections afforded by the
Family Law Act from their connection to a marital family.310 This inclusion of “ex-nuptial” children within the Act, which was determined to
exceed Parliament’s (xxi) and (xxii) powers, was authorized by referrals
from the states and enacted pursuant to subsection (xxxvii).311
Despite these significant gains in making ex-nuptial children part of a
family, a significant challenge remained for same-sex couples with children, as a result of the way the law assigned parentage. Under the Family
Law Act, parents were defined as the children’s genetic parents (the male
and female gamete contributors) or the adoptive parents who, pursuant to
state adoption law, had legally displaced the genetic parents. Restrictions
on same-sex couples’ access to assisted reproductive technologies and
adoption were both controlled by state law, and the lack of recognition of
their partners as parents had curtailed same-sex couples’ access to the legal
regime designed to safeguard children’s welfare and to recognize and protect the relationships between children and those caring for them.312
At the same time as it amended the Family Law Act to extend its financial provisions to de facto couples, Parliament extended its definition of
“parent” in the Family Law Act to include certain categories of non-biologically related same-sex partners.313 The amendments also added language
308. See Sifris & Gerber, supra note 293, at 104.
309. See Watts, supra note 135, at 138.
310. See supra notes 136– 137 and accompanying text.
311. Family Law Amendment Act 1987 (Cth); see Part II.B.
312. See Jenni Millbank, Recognition of Lesbian and Gay Families in Australian Law—
Part Two: Children, 34 FED. L. REV. 1 (2006) (documenting state-imposed limitations
imposed upon same-sex couples’ access to adoption and assisted reproductive technologies (ART)).
313. Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 60H (“parent” includes the consenting female de
facto partner of a woman who conceived through ART); Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)
s60HA (“parent” includes an individual whose de facto partner has adopted a child with
the individual’s consent).
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clarifying the non-parentage of those who contribute gametes as donors
without intent to become parents and of those who have served as
surrogates.314
These provisions, like the amendments focused on the de facto relationship, go far in equalizing the legal status of members of a same-sex
headed household. But, as with that relationship itself, the legal treatment
of parent-child relationships between children and the same-sex couples
who care for them is not identical to the legal treatment of the relationships
between children and either (1) non-genetically related but married heterosexual parents, or (2) genetically related heterosexual parents, whether
married or not. To a significant extent, same-sex parental rights under the
Family Law Act are still dependent on state law and policy that control
homosexual individuals’ access to both assistive reproductive technology
procedures and adoption.315 And a non-genetic, same-sex partner is not
recognized under the terms of the Act as a parent unless that individual
partner qualifies as the de facto partner of a legally recognized parent by
biology or adoption.316 The failure to meet the conditions required to
establish a de facto relationship could prevent a non-genetically related
individual from being recognized as a parent, even if that individual is
actively playing that role within the family.317
In this sense, the current parentage rules reintroduce a parallel to the
nuptial/ex-nuptial distinction for children in same-sex headed households
and manifest the ongoing effect of the limits the Australian constitutional
framers placed on the scope of the Commonwealth’s authority over parental rights. Providing for a registration mechanism that has the effect of
establishing a de facto relationship could address the operational problem
314. See Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 60H.
315. At the time of writing, same-sex couples have the right to be considered for adoption in the following states and territories: Australian Capital Territory, New South
Wales, Tasmania, and Western Australia. Adoption Act 1993 (ACT) s 14; Adoption Act
2000 (NSW) s 23; Adoption Act 1988 (Tas) s 20; Adoption Act 1994 (WA) s 38. However,
this right has not been recognized in the following states and territories: Northern Territory, Queensland, South Australia, and Victoria. Adoption of Children Act 1994 (NT) s 15;
Adoption Act 2009 (Qld) s 92; Adoption Act 1998 (SA) s 12(3); Adoption Act 1984 (Vict) s
11. Victoria would, however, in some limited circumstances, permit a same-sex partner
to adopt a child of his or her partner, as a second parent. Id. at ss 11(6)-(7). In every
jurisdiction besides South Australia, same-sex female couples have access to assisted
reproductive technology (ART) and give the non-birthing female partner (referred to as
“co-mother”) parental rights to the child. Parentage Act 2004 (ACT) s 8; Status of Children Act 1996 (NSW) s 14; Status of Children Act 2003 (NT) s 5DA; Status of Children Act
1978 (Qld) s 19B; Status of Children Act 1974 (Tas) S 10C(1A); Status of Children Act
1974 (Vic) s 13; Artificial Conception Act 1985 (WA) S 6A. State surrogacy laws are
complex, confusing, and inconsistent. See Jenni Millbank, The New Surrogacy Parentage
Laws in Australia: Cautious Regulation of ‘25 Brick Walls, 35 MELB. U. L. REV. 165, 180
(2011); see generally Jenni Millbank, Resolving the Dilemma of Legal Parentage for Australians Engaged in International Surrogacy, 27 AUSTL. J. FAM. L.135 (2013).
316. Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 60HA.
317. One of the relevant factors in determining whether a de facto relationship exists
is whether the partners are involved together in caring for and supporting children, but
another factor is the duration of the relationship. See Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s
4AA(2).
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with the current law. But just as for two adults in a same-sex relationship,
the status of marriage is believed to confer some important symbolic value
on the children of that marriage, a value that cannot be preserved under
any other term.318
c. The Special Question of Marriage
Under the Australian constitutional design, the operational issues can
continue to be worked out “American style” among the states. But the symbolic issue, whether same-sex couples can be “married,” is tightly tied to
the meaning of the term as set out in the Marriage Act and in section
51(xxi) of the Constitution. For most of its history under its Constitution,
the legal meaning of “marriage” was assumed to be the traditional common
law definition of the term. As this assumption began to be challenged
throughout the world, the Commonwealth Parliament took action to secure
the traditional meaning by expressly incorporating the common law definition of marriage into the Marriage Act and by expressly forbidding the
recognition of same-sex marriages validly celebrated in other countries.
It is hard to deny the commonality of DOMA and the Marriage Act
Amendment, which both defined marriage along traditional lines and qualified the lex loci celebrationis obligation for same-sex marriages. However,
there are fundamental distinctions in the consequences for individuals
denied the “marriage” status in the two countries— one distinction being a
product of the two countries’ difference in federalism regimes, and the
other simply going to the substantive effect of the two Acts. Reflecting the
two countries’ federalism divergence, DOMA denied validly married samesex couples the benefits of marriage associated with federal laws, leaving
the heart of marriage rights and obligations in the hands of the states.319
Australia’s Marriage Act Amendment, in contrast, controlled federal access
to marriage in Australia, and no state or territory law existed to offer a
marriage alternative. On the substance of the two Acts, however, the Marriage Act took considerably less from same-sex couples than did DOMA;
DOMA denied same-sex couples all the material benefits that United States
federal law confers on married individuals, whereas Australia’s Parliament
withheld the special status of “marriage,” but conferred, in separate legislation,320 many of the material federal benefits of marriage to same-sex
couples.
While most of the state developments in the regulation of same-sex
relationships stopped short of conferring “marriage” on same-sex couples,
a number of state legislatures attempted to provide for comparable institutions under another name, and some even proposed bills providing for
318. See Sifris & Gerber, supra note 293, at 101– 03 (“While there are no credible
arguments for excluding same-sex couples from the institution of marriage, there is a
cogent argument that same-sex couples should be allowed to marry in order to remove
the negative impact that the ineligibility of parents to marry has on children”).
319. See supra notes 202, 211– 214 and accompanying text.
320. Same-Sex Relationships (Equal Treatment in Commonwealth Law— General Law
Reform) Act 2008 (Cth).
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same-sex marriage.321 Leading the way with this experimentation was the
Australian Capital Territory (ACT), which first attempted to enact a Civil
Union Act in 2006 and 2008. But the national government, which has
plenary authority over the ACT, disallowed the 2006 marriage bill and
threatened disallowance, forcing withdrawal, of the 2008 bill.322 The
Labor Government explained that it rejected the ACT’s attempts to “mimic”
marriage because such civil union laws were inconsistent with the Federal
Marriage Act’s exclusion of same-sex marriage.323 Then in November
2013, the ACT went further and enacted a law that largely copied the Commonwealth Marriage Act except in its specification of who could marry.324
A number of couples were married under this law, and the constitutionality of the law and the validity of those marriages were promptly challenged
by the Commonwealth.325 It was through this challenge, that the High
Court addressed the scope of the Commonwealth’s Marriage power.326
2. Commonwealth v. ACT
On December 12, 2013, the law on same-sex marriage in Australia
was catapulted into a new era. In The Commonwealth v. Australian Capital
Territory (ACT), the High Court struck down the ACT’s Marriage Equality
(Same Sex) Act 2013, finding that the law exceeded the ACT’s legislative
authority.327 As stated by the High Court, the central legal issue in the case
was whether the challenged ACT Act authorizing same-sex marriages in the
Capital Territory was inconsistent with the Federal Marriage Act (1961),
and the Court concluded that it was.328 In reaching this conclusion, the
Court reasoned that it first had to determine whether same-sex marriage
321. See FEHLBERG & BEHRENS, supra note 48, at 4.4.4.(discussing state laws providing
for marriage-like registration and recognition under other names); George Williams &
Sangeetha Pillai, The High Court, the Constitution and Family Law (Paper presented at
“The High Court and Family Law,” 16th National Family Law Conference, Sydney, 9
October 2014, manuscript on file with authors) at 15– 16 (discussing same-sex marriage
bills considered in various state parliaments).
322. See generally Margaret Brock & Dan Meagher, The Legal Recognition of Same-Sex
unions in Australia: A Constitutional Analysis, 22 PUB. L. REV. 266 (2011). Because the
Commonwealth Government has plenary authority over territories, including the ACT,
there was no question that its disallowance of this civil union measure was
constitutional.
323. Patrick Goodenough, Australian Gov’t Shuts Down Bid for Same-Sex Unions, CNS
NEWS (July 7, 2008), http://cnsnews.com/news/article/australian-govt-shuts-down-bidsame-sex-unions.
324. Marriage Equality (Same-sex) Act 2013 (ACT).
325. Lisa Cox, Same-Sex Marriage Law High Court Challenge Confirmed, the Sydney
Morning Herald (Oct. 10, 2013), http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/politicalnews/samesex-marriage-law-high-court-challenge-confirmed-20131010-2vaqe.html.
326. In an interesting (if imperfect) federalist mirror image, the scope of Australia’s
national power was tested through a territory’s exercise of power, just as the scope of the
American states’ power over marriage played a central role in resolving a federal challenge to Congress’s power to enact DOMA.
327. Commonwealth v Australian Capital Territory (2013)250 CLR 411.
328. Commonwealth v Australian Capital Territory, (2013) 250 CLR 411, at 453 ¶ 4.
The High Court did not reach the question of whether the ACT Act was also inconsistent
with the Federal Family Law Act (1975) which was also raised in the litigation. Id. ¶ 5.
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came within the meaning of “marriage” in section 51(xxi) of the Constitution, because, if that constitutional provision did not give the Federal Parliament the authority to recognize same-sex marriage, the ACT Act
authorizing same-sex marriage in its territory would “probably”329 be consistent with the federal law defining federal marriage as exclusively
between one man and one woman.330
The Court noted that the three litigants in the case before the Court331
had all submitted that “marriage” in section 51(xxi) included same-sex
marriage, and the Court concluded “[t]hat submission is right and should
be accepted.”332 Plainly, deciding the scope of the constitutional word,
“marriage,” was not a simple matter of looking it up in a dictionary. Over
the years, strong arguments had been made to restrict Parliament’s power
over “marriage” to the common law meaning of the term established long
before the Australian constitutional convention, just as there had been
arguments for a broader interpretation.333 The High Court had a choice; its
judgment, reached swiftly334 and unanimously,335 had the great value of
329. See infra note 360 and accompanying text.
330. Commonwealth v Australian Capital Territory, (2013) 250 CLR 411, 454 ¶ 9.
331. The three parties were the Commonwealth, ACT, and the amicus curiae, Australian Marriage Equality Inc. See id. at 452, ¶ 2.
332. Id. The High Court went on to acknowledge, however, that the Court, and not
the parties “by agreement or concession,” must determine the meaning of the Constitution. Id. ¶¶ 8, 9. In critical analysis of the Court’s decision, academic writers argued
that the Court relied too much on the litigants’ concession and should not have reached
the constitutional issue without a “contradictor” arguing that “marriage” within the
meaning of section 51(xxi) did not include same-sex marriage. Patrick Parkinson &
Nicholas Aroney, The Territory of Marriage: Constitutional law, marriage law and family
policy in the ACT Same Sex Marriage Case, 28 AUSTL. J. FAM. L. 160, 162 (2014), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2435016 (citing pp. 25– 26); see
generally Anne Twomey, Same-Sex Marriage and Constitutional Interpretation, AUSTL. L. J.
613, 613 (2014).
333. See Brock & Meagher, supra note 326; Lindell, supra note 210; Geoffrey Lindell,
State Legislative Power to Enact Same-Sex Marriage Legislation, and the Effect of the Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) as amended by the Marriage Amendment Act 2004 (Cth), 9 CONST. L.
& POL’Y REV. 25 (2006); George Williams, Can Tasmania Legislate for Same-Sex Marriage?, 31 TASMANIA L. REV., 117 (2012) ; George Williams, Advice Regarding the Proposed
Same-Sex Marriage Act, 9 CONST. L. & POL’Y REV. 21 (2006); Luke Taylor, Getting Over
It? The Future of Same Sex Marriage in Australia, 27 AUSTL. J. FAM. L. 26 (2013).
In their article, Brock and Meagher worked through a number of alternative possibilities, including a number of arguments supporting or opposing the conclusion that the
High Court eventually reached. Brock and Meagher assumed, as did most others dealing
with the same-sex marriage issue before it was decided, that a High Court decision
would come as a result of the Commonwealth Parliament’s enacting legislation recognizing same-sex marriage followed by a challenge on the ground that the Commonwealth
had exceeded its section 51(xxi) powers. Brock & Meagher, supra note 326, at 270– 72.
That the case did not arise in that way deprived the High Court of a consideration that
Brock and Meagher argued would lend support to the Court’s decision: deference to the
“democratically elected representatives of the Australian people.” Id. at 272. Cf. Lindell,
supra note 210, at 29 (quoting Cass Sunstein).
334. According to Professor Twomey, “the case was rushed both in hearing and judgment.”Twomey, supra note 336, at 613. The High Court’s decision in the case came just
a month after the law went into effect, and days after marriage ceremonies were performed under the law. Adam Withnall, Australia: Gay marriage law reversed by high
court less than a week after first weddings, The Independent (Dec. 12, 2013), http://www
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opening the way for a policy decision in the Commonwealth Parliament to
recognize same-sex marriage if and when a national consensus supported
such a policy.336
The High Court began the explanation of its judgment by pointing out
that the constitutional provisions giving authority to the Commonwealth
Parliament over marriage and divorce were a direct result of a fundamental
decision about federalism and the allocation of legislative power between
state and the national governments and was inspired by their concern with
the American divorce experience. The Court explained that sections
51(xxi) and (xxii) “were included in the Constitution to avoid what the
framers saw as a great defect in the United States Constitution,” which left
these family law subjects to potentially diverse and inconsistent state regulation.337 The Australian framers chose, instead, to give these powers to
the Commonwealth Parliament in order “to provide uniform laws governing marriage and divorce.”338
The Court rejected the utility of adopting any “single all-embracing
theory of constitutional interpretation;”339 and dismissed any suggestion
that it should be guided by constructions predicated on theories of
“originalism” or “original intent” because such interpretive methods “serve
only to obscure much more than they illuminate.”340 Instead, the Court
said, section 51(xxi) should be construed “as using the word ‘marriage’ in
the sense of a ‘topic of juristic classification.’ ”341 Although disclaiming a
“precise definition,” the Court maintained that the description provided by
Justice Windeyer in the Marriage Act Case was sufficient “for the purposes
of this case.”342 In that case, Justice Windeyer maintained that the relevant
“topic of juristic classification” is “laws of a kind ‘generally considered, for
comparative law and private international law, as being the subjects of a
country’s marriage law.’ ”343 More generally, the Court cited precedent
from outside the family law context to declare that the “ ‘[p]ower to make
laws as to any class of rights involves a power to alter those rights, to define
those rights, to limit those rights, to extend those rights, and to extend the
.independent.co.uk/news/world/australasia/australia-gay-marriage-law-reversed-lessthan-a-week-after-first-weddings-8999422.html.
The High Court’s decision in the case came just a month after the law went into effect,
and days after marriage ceremonies were performed under the law.
335. Justice Gageler did not participate in the High Court’s decision because, as Solicitor General before his appointment to the High Court, he had given legal advice to the
Commonwealth government. See Parkinson & Aroney, supra note 336, at 181, n.86.
336. Along with their criticism of the Court’s decision, Parkinson and Aroney conceded this value. See Parkinson & Aroney, supra note 336, at 188. (noting that the High
Court had made clear which legislative body had authority to determine whether or not
same-sex marriages should be recognized, and also that it was not the Court’s role to
make the determination).
337. Commonwealth v Australian Capital Territory, (2013) 250 CLR 411, 453, ¶ 7.
338. Id.
339. Id. at 455 ¶ 14.
340. Id.
341. Id. See Twomey, supra note 336, at 615 (commenting on other uses of this term).
342. Commonwealth v Australian Capital Territory, (2013) 250 CLR 411, 459 ¶ 22.
343. Attorney-General (Vic) v The Commonwealth (1962) 107 CLR 529, 578.
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class of those who may enjoy those rights.”344
In rejecting the common law definition of marriage, commonly quoted
as “the voluntary union for life of one man and one woman, to the exclusion of all others,”345 the Court stressed that, even between the forming of
the English common law version and the time of the making of the Australian Constitution in 1900, the concept of marriage had undergone significant change. The Court pointed out that, by the time of federation,
marriage could be dissolved by judicial decree. Thus, it had become “a
voluntary union entered into for life. It was no longer a union for life.”346
The concept of “marriage” in the constitution, the High Court concluded,
is best understood as an evolving social institution, whose evolution the
Commonwealth Parliament is given authority to influence.347
Having concluded that “marriage” in s 51(xxi) of the Australian Constitution included same-sex marriage, the Court went on to conclude that
the amendment to the Marriage Act in 2004, specifying that “marriage”
was between one man and one woman, was meant to be an exhaustive use
of that term.348 Thus, the federal statute occupied the entire field of “marriage,” including what the Commonwealth Parliament deliberately chose to
exclude from the field of legally valid marriages. Once it was established
that the Commonwealth’s constitutional power to regulate “marriage”
included “same-sex marriage,” the ACT’s argument that “same-sex marriage” and “marriage” were two different things, in effect occupying two
different “fields,” was no longer possible.349
The Australian High Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. ACT, and
the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Windsor, each reinforced
their countries’ alternative visions of family law federalism that was first
captured in 1900. In Windsor, the Supreme Court sought to preserve the
state laboratory theory, and prevented Congress from enlarging its role in
defining marriage. In the ACT case, on the other hand, the Australian High
344. Commonwealth v Australian Capital Territory, (2013) 250 CLR at 459, n. 68. The
Court also drew upon the analogy between the terms “trademarks” and “marriage” in
arguing that the meaning of things named in the Constitution were not fixed according
to the state of the law in 1900. See id. at 459 ¶ 21 (quoting from Grain Pool of Western
Australia v The Commonwealth, (1908) 6 CLR 469, 494.
345. Hyde v. Hyde and Woodmansee [1886] 1 L.R.P. & D. 130, 133 (Eng.). This case
and this language are commonly quoted when the common law definition of marriage is
invoked.
346. Commonwealth v Australian Capital Territory (2013) 250 CLR 411, 456, ¶ 17.
347. Id.at 457, ¶ 18 (quoting Justice Windeyer in the Marriage Act Case).
348. Id. at 468 ¶ 57.
349. However, it is arguable that a state or territorial law regulating “same-sex marriage” might be found to be outside of the federally occupied field if the details of the
law and its rights and responsibilities were sufficiently different. The High Court put
some emphasis on the fact that the ACT Act stressed marriage equality, and on the Act’s
nearly verbatim copy of the terms in the federal Marriage Act. Commonwealth v Australian Capital Territory (2013) 250 CLR 411, 468– 69, ¶¶ 59– 61. In their critical analysis
of the Court’s opinion, Parkinson and Aroney suggested that the ACT weakened its position when it did not follow Professor George Williams’s advice to write a different-looking statute with provisions not entirely mirroring the federal statute. See Parkinson &
Aroney, supra note 329, at 173– 74; see also Williams & Pillai, supra note 325.
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Court recognized Parliament’s authority to impose uniformity on the
nation’s definition of marriage. But each of these decisions reflects important differences in the state of the law since 1900, differences which alter
the operation of the two countries’ family law federalism. In Windsor, the
growing importance of federal civil rights in addressing family law questions is evident, even as the Court emphasized the traditional deference the
federal government has shown the states in defining marriage. And Commonwealth v. ACT makes clear that Commonwealth legislation can act as an
obstacle to state-level innovation as well as an engine of progress.
3. What is Left of the State Laboratories after the ACT Case?
The obvious political question after the High Court’s decision is if
and, more likely, when and through what process of decision-making, the
Federal Parliament will vote to bring same-sex marriages within the authorization of the federal Marriage Act. The trend of popular opinion in Australia,350 as elsewhere in the “western” world,351 would seem to suggest
that this will happen, perhaps even fairly soon. So far, however, neither one
of the major political parties in Australia has embraced same-sex-marriage.352 Therefore, in the immediate future, national legislation favoring
same-sex marriage would seem to depend on one or both of those parties
approving a “conscience vote,” under which individual members of Parliament are permitted to vote their personal views independent of their
party’s position.353
In the meantime, the important question for Australian family law federalism is whether, and to what extent, states can continue to experiment
with their regulation of same-sex couples and their families, an experiment
that began over two decades ago with their development of legal protections for unmarried couples.354 The same-sex marriage case left little or no
room for state experimentation in the name of “same-sex marriage.”355
Under a broad reading of Parliament’s authority over marriage under section 51(xxi), plus its incidental power under section 51(xxxix),356 the Mar350. The report of polling data for Australia for the period from 2004 (the year the
Marriage Act was amended to limit “marriage” to opposite sex couples) to the present
shows a dramatic increase in support for same-sex marriage from 38% to 72%. Public
Opinion: Nationally, AUSTRALIAN MARRIAGE EQUALITY.ORG, http://www.australianmarri
ageequality.org/who-supports-equality/a-majority-of-australians-support-marriageequality/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2015).
351. Of special significance was the legalization of same-sex marriage in New Zealand, a country with a comparably strong British common law background and a close
geographic and cultural connection to Australia. See Marriage (Definition of Marriage)
Amendment Act 2013 (N.Z.), http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2013/0020/latest/096be8ed80a81b0d.pdf
352. See Brock & Meagher, supra note 326, at 369.
353. See id. at 369, n.31 (discussing how calls for such a vote have been made, but not
yet implemented).
354. See discussion supra Part III.B.1.
355. But see note 346.
356. In Commonwealth v Australian Capital Territory, the High Court indirectly left
open a wide preemptive field when it said the Marriage Equality (Same Sex) 2013 (ACT
Act) would “probably” operate concurrently with the federal Marriage Act. Common-
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riage Act might even be understood to preclude as inconsistent a broad
range of state legislation regulating same-sex relationships. Under such a
broad reading of Parliament’s marriage-plus-incidental power, Commonwealth legislation might be interpreted as occupying a field wide enough to
cover all manner and form of same-sex relationships (or, for that matter,
opposite sex non-marital relationships), including “unions,” “partnerships,” “domestic” entities, “de facto” couples, administrative registration
of same-sex and other non-married couples. Perhaps some or all of these
state laws might be found to have some impact on Parliament’s ability to
shape the meaning and limits of federal marriage.357
The strength of the argument for inconsistency would seem to depend
on both the wording of the federal marriage law and the operable terms of
the challenged, and arguably inconsistent, state or territory law. It seems
unlikely, therefore, that de facto and closely-related domestic partnership
regulations would be found to be inconsistent, as their terminology and,
more important, their reach, are quite significantly distinct from the reach
of “marriage” under the federal Act.358 The argument against the implication of inconsistency seems particularly strong when, as is now true, there
are extensive federal laws protecting same-sex relationships. As we have
seen, legislation based on the Commonwealth’s referral power and state
parliament referrals has led to sweeping revision of the Federal Family Law
Act to bring about something approaching equivalent treatment of married
couples and unmarried (including same-sex) couples.359 Moreover, independent of that referral-based legislation, the federal government has
enacted legislation under its own national powers for the express purpose
of eliminating discriminatory treatment of same-sex couples.360 This legislation was not based on the Commonwealth Parliament’s marriage, incidental, or referred powers, but rather on its power to create and shape the
federal programs that were designed and implemented in a discriminatory
fashion.361
What is least clear, after the High Court’s decision, is the extent to
which states can recognize marriage-like institutions for same-sex relationships. Can a state allow a “celebration” or “solemnization” of a same-sex
union that mirrors a marriage ceremony? Can a state provide for a “civil
union,” that expressly copies some or all aspects of marriage? The ACT’s
wealth v Australian Capital Territory, (2013) 250 CLR 411, 454 (emphasis added), if
same-sex marriage was outside “marriage” in section 51(xxi). This comment suggested
a possible, albeit not a probable, pre-emptive legislative power extending beyond the
marriage power itself.
357. See Brock & Meagher, supra note 326, at 274– 77; Lindell, supra note 210, at 44.
358. See supra Part III.B.1.a.
359. Id.
360. Same-Sex Relationships (Equal Treatment in Commonwealth Law-General Law
Reform) Act 2008 (Cth).
361. See Brock & Meagher, supra note 326, at 277 (mentioning federal power sources
related to social security, taxation, defense, and immigration, among other legal benefits). The nature of the sources of national legislative power parallels Congress’s source
of legislative power to enact the now invalid section 3 of DOMA. See discussion supra
Part III.A.3.ii.
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experience suggests that the authority for states and territories to take
these steps is uncertain.362 In 2006 the Governor-General disallowed363
the Act which provided for “civil unions” between two persons before a
“civil union celebrant” and one other witness, and included a preamble
providing that this Act would allow two people to “enter into a legally recognized relationship that is to be treated under territory law in the same
way as a marriage.”364 That disallowed Act was replaced by the Civil Partnership Bill 2006, which, to reduce the marriage equivalency concerns,
substituted “partnership” for “union” and “civil partnership notary” for a
marriage celebrant.365 The ACT’s status as a territory and the national
Government’s plenary authority over ACT legislation, clearly limit the
direct application of this ACT experience to a constitutional analysis of the
state’s authority, but the focus of concern on the marriage-like status and
operation of the ACT’s laws suggests the grounds that could support a
finding of “inconsistency” between state marriage-equivalency laws and
the Federal Marriage Act.366
Scholars Margaret Brock and Dan Meagher have considered the inconsistency issue in some detail.367 They have hypothesized an amended Federal Marriage Act that expressly precludes any same-sex union “that is the
functional equivalent of marriage” and have considered the application of
such an act to a state statute like the disallowed ACT civil union bill. They
reasoned that, if the commonwealth statute “were considered to be within
the incidental range of the marriage power, the state legislation . . . would
likely be invalidated by section 109 of the Constitution” because it “would
clearly ‘impair . . . the operation of a law of the Commonwealth Parliament.’ ”368 It is far from clear that the High Court would take such an
362. In their detailed and comprehensive analysis, Brock and Meagher drew significantly upon the sequence of same-sex couple bills advanced and laws adopted by the
government of the Australian Capital Territory (prior to the rise and fall of the ACT
Marriage Equality Act in 2013). Brock and Meagher considered objections and actions
actually taken in opposition to these various ACT laws, all more modest in protecting
same-sex couples than the ACT Act that was struck down by the High Court. See Brock
& Meagher, supra note 326, at 27– 77.
363. A disallowance is analogous to a presidential veto. See AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION
§§ 58– 60.
364. Brock & Meagher, supra note 326, at 275.
365. Id. at 275– 76. According to ACT Attorney-General Simon Corbell, the more
compromised bill was also threatened with disallowance because of its provisions for
creation rather than recognition and registration of a relationship and for “ceremonial
confirmation” of a couple’s partnership. Id. at 276.
366. Id. at 276– 77 (acknowledging that the examples provided by the ACT must be
qualified because of the federal government’s section 122 plenary power to disallow a
territory law without any showing of the inconsistency required to invalidate a state law
under section 109, but noting that the examples nevertheless were well designed to show
the potential arguments for state law invalidity under section 109).
367. Id. at 274– 77.
368. Id. at 275 (quoting the test stated in Victoria v Commonwealth (1937) 58 CLR
618, 630 (Dixon J); see Dickson v The Queen (2010) 241 CLR 491, 502 (French CJ,
Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ). A consideration of whether
state recognition of same-sex marriage-like relationships would impair the operation of
the national marriage law would likely raise some of the same issues addressed under
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expansive view of the marriage power. As with the United States, it
remains to be seen how much work still can and will (or perhaps even
must) be done in the state laboratories, before a new national consensus
emerges.
Conclusion
In drafting its Constitution, Australia borrowed heavily from the
American federalism model. It chose to depart from that model, however,
in assigning power over marriage, divorce, and some related parental matters to its national Parliament. This topic-specific deviation from the American model was designed to address a particular problem facing both
countries— the regulation of divorce within and across states. This problem was pressed particularly sharply because both countries’ citizens could
and did move freely from one state to another, and the stakes of such
moves when divorce was involved— ongoing obligations to first spouses,
the validity of subsequent marriages, and the legitimacy of children from
those marriages— were high. While the distinctions in their family law federalism regimes took the two countries on somewhat different paths
through their twentieth century development of the law of divorce, both
countries began with experimentation in the states, and, at roughly the
same time, shifted to a stable national consensus.
In the United States, the states’ exclusive power to regulate divorce led
to valuable experimentation and cross-border learning but also created
interstate instability that concerned Americans as well as Australians.
Once the American federal courts imposed a strong full faith and credit
obligation on states to recognize one another’s divorce judgments, however, this instability was resolved. Subsequently, this stable interstate
diversity was displaced by considerable national uniformity around a
scheme of no-fault divorce, albeit a uniformity achieved state-by-state
rather than through national law.
In Australia, the lack of political consensus prevented the Commonwealth Parliament from enacting national legislation for over half a century, and in the interim, Australian states exercised their concurrent power
to regulate divorce. This produced a similar period of state-level experimentation, with similar benefits and costs to that experienced in the
United States. When a national consensus in favor of no-fault divorce ultimately emerged, however, Australia’s Parliament exercised its constitutional authority to enact a national uniform law. Relying on state referral
power, moreover, the Commonwealth Parliament was able to build upon
state experimentation to expand the scope of national uniformity in the
law of divorce and related matters.
In the context of divorce, the timing of legal and social change in both
countries was such that, despite their federalism differences, they each had
the benefit of a period of state-level experimentation followed by the beneAmerican constitutional law, when courts are called on to assess whether there is a
sufficient justification for discrimination in denying marriage to same-sex couples.
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fit of a nationally uniform approach. That being said, the paths open for
future changes in the law of divorce are clearly different under the two
family law federalism regimes, as American states could again engage in
radical experimentation whereas Australian state-level experimentation
would be significantly inhibited by preemptive federal law. But this difference is likely to have no practical effect in the foreseeable future, as there
are no dramatic shifts in social norms pressing for changes in divorce law
on the horizon.
The chronology of legal and social developments is playing out differently, however, in Australia’s consideration of same-sex marriage, and this
distinction, more starkly demonstrates the potential trade-offs between the
American and Australian approaches to family law federalism. As with
divorce, the United States has engaged in radical state-level experimentation with same-sex marriage, creating an increasing number of states
where same-sex couples can live and marry and fostering a new, emerging,
national consensus concerning such marriages. In Australia, by contrast,
Parliament’s enactment of the Marriage Amendment Act in 2004, which
codified the consensus of that time, has served as a significant roadblock
to any continuing state-level experimentation. If, and likely when, Australia recognizes same-sex marriage, that recognition will come through
national legislation, with all the benefits of national uniformity. But those
benefits will have come at some cost— both in the loss of the benefits of
state-level experimentation that did not occur and in the denial of marriage
for some period to all same-sex couples in Australia, including those living
in, or prepared to move to, states ready to celebrate their marriages prior to
the enactment of a federal law. And, of course, the fact that such a future
enactment is likely, does not mean that it is guaranteed. The lost opportunity for state-level experimentation might well inhibit the emergence of a
national political consensus.
Up until 2013, the evolution of the law regulating same-sex marriage
in the United States repeated that of the early twentieth century regulation
of divorce, with all the same benefits and costs. This repetition even
extended to the courts’ failure under the Full Faith and Credit Clause to
recognize same-sex marriages validly (and non-evasively) celebrated in
other states, repeating the failure in the early divorce litigation. But with
Windsor and subsequent developments in lower federal courts, an emerging shift toward a national uniform law of same-sex marriage is apparent.
In all likelihood, this shift will end in the Supreme Court’s recognition of a
constitutional right to same-sex marriage, possibly even before this Article
is in print. If the Supreme Court surprises most prognosticators and rules
that same-sex couples do not have an equal protection or due process right
to marry, then the state-level experimentation will continue and the need
for a stable rule of interstate recognition will increase. If, however, the
Court finds the right to same-sex marriage protected by the Constitution,
the United States will have created a substantial new area of national family law.
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The approach to the achievement of national uniformity in the United
States, albeit through the judicial process, predicts an Australian-like, preemptive shift away from state-level control. Australia’s experience with
same-sex marriage suggests that this shift will come at some cost. While
even a federal, individual-rights-based recognition of same-sex marriage in
the United States can be understood, in large part, to have grown out of the
initial, robust state-level experimentation for and against same-sex marriage, the emergence of federal rights of liberty and equality that would
compel recognition of same-sex marriage in the United States would likely
foretell a broader shift to a national, court-articulated rights-based family
law, as judicial precedents are applied in new contexts. Such a shift to
national control, the Australian experience suggests, could place some constraint on valuable state-level experimentation in future areas of changing
societal norms.
We are in no better position than the Australian framers were to predict what that new shift in norms might be. Perhaps changes in assisted
reproductive technologies and in the use of surrogates will produce radically new conceptions of parentage that will destabilize parent-child-relationships when families move across state lines. Perhaps, even, a
multiplication of those recognized as legal parents of a child could alter
attitudes about polygamy that now seem well beyond the range of broad
societal norms. Whatever that next, barely imaginable, shift in social
norms might be, Australia’s experience with same-sex marriage suggests
that the development of national uniform laws, however valuable for uniformity and stability, and however justified and broadly supported at the
time, may constrain the sort of dramatic state-level experimentation that
scandalized the framers of the Australian Constitution, but that has served
both countries well.

